How does health promotion work? Evidence from the dirty business of eliminating open defecation by Gertler, Paul et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOW DOES HEALTH PROMOTION WORK? EVIDENCE FROM THE DIRTY BUSINESS
OF ELIMINATING OPEN DEFECATION
Paul Gertler
Manisha Shah
Maria Laura Alzua
Lisa Cameron
Sebastian Martinez
Sumeet Patil
Working Paper 20997
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20997
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
March 2015
Gertler and Shah led the analysis and drafting of this paper with support from the other authors. Patil
led the India evaluation, Cameron and Shah led the Indonesia Evaluation, Alzua led the Mali evaluation
and Martinez led the Tanzania evaluation. Ben Arnold, Berta Briceno, Jack Colford, Sebastian Galiani,
Jack Molyneaux and Alex Orsla provided valuable inputs into the country evaluations. The authors
also wish to thank Cameron Bresline, Pascaline Dupas, Josh Gruber and seminar participants at UC
Berkeley, USC and the 2015 AEA meetings in Boston for helpful comments. The authors gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the Water and Sanitation Program at the World Bank through
a grant from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Lisa Cameron and Manisha Shah also acknowledge
funding from the Australian Research Council, Grant No.  DP0987011. The opinions expressed in
this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the organizations
where they work or of the funders. The authors have no material or financial interests in the results
or opinions expressed in the paper. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2015 by Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah, Maria Laura Alzua, Lisa Cameron, Sebastian Martinez, and
Sumeet Patil. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
How Does Health Promotion Work? Evidence From The Dirty Business of Eliminating Open
Defecation
Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah, Maria Laura Alzua, Lisa Cameron, Sebastian Martinez, and Sumeet
Patil
NBER Working Paper No. 20997
March 2015
JEL No. I12,I15,O15
ABSTRACT
We investigate the mechanisms underlying health promotion campaigns designed to eliminate open
defecation in at-scale randomized field experiments in four countries: India, Indonesia, Mali, and
Tanzania. Health promotion works through a number of mechanisms, including: providing information
on the return to better behavior, nudging better behavior that one already knows is in her self-interest,
and encouraging households to invest in health products that lower the marginal cost of good behavior.
We find that health promotion generally worked through both convincing households to invest in
in-home sanitation facilities and nudging increased use of those facilities.
We also estimate the causal relationship between village open defecation rates and child height using
experimentally induced variation in open defecation for identification. Surprisingly we find a fairly
linear relationship between village open defecation rates and the height of children less than 5 years
old. Fully eliminating open defecation from a village where everyone defecates in the open would
increase child height by 0.44 standard deviations. Hence modest to small reductions in open defecation
are unlikely to have a detectable effect on child height and explain why many health promotion interventions
designed to reduce open defecation fail to improve child height. Our results suggest that stronger interventions
that combine intensive health promotional nudges with subsidies for sanitation construction may be
needed to reduce open defecation enough to generate meaningful improvements in child health.
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1 INTRODUCTION	  
Much	  of	  health	  status	  is	  driven	  by	  individual	  choices	  over	  diet,	  exercise,	  hygiene	  and	  risk	  
behaviors.	   	   However,	   successfully	   promoting	   healthy	   behavior	   has	   been	   notoriously	   difficult	  
because	  existing	   (unhealthy)	  behaviors	  are	  deep-­‐rooted	  habits	   that	   form	  early	   in	   life	  and	  are	  
reinforced	  by	  cultural	  and	  social	  norms.	  Small	  monetary,	  time,	  and	  hassle	  costs	  can	  be	  enough	  
to	  inhibit	  changing	  well-­‐established	  habits	  even	  if	  such	  inert	  behavior	  is	  suboptimal	  (DellaVigna	  
2009;	   Sunskind	   and	   Thaler	   2008).	   Despite	   vast	   investment	   in	   information	   and	   promotion	  
campaigns,	   large	   numbers	   of	   people	   who	   know	   better	   continue	   to	   behave	   in	   ways	   that	   are	  
detrimental	  to	  their	  long-­‐term	  health	  such	  as	  smoking,	  consuming	  too	  much	  sugar,	  not	  washing	  
their	  hands,	  substance	  abuse,	  open	  defecation,	  and	  risky	  sex.	  	  
There	   are	   two	   broad	   categories	   of	   interventions	   widely	   used	   to	   promote	   healthy	  
behavior.	   The	   first	   subsidizes	   the	   purchase	   of	   health	   products,	   such	   as	   a	   water	   filters	   and	  
insecticide	   treated	  bednets,	   that	   lowers	   the	   cost	   of	   healthy	  behavior	   and	   thereby	  makes	   the	  
behavior	  more	  convenient	  (Dupas	  2014b).1	  	  Subsidies	  for	  health	  products	  are	  typically	  justified	  
based	   on	   public	   goods	   arguments.	   Since	   the	   use	   of	   health	   products	   prevents	   parasitic	   and	  
infectious	  diseases	  that	  would	  otherwise	  spillover	  into	  other	  households,	  private	  investment	  in	  
health	  products	  is	  likely	  socially	  suboptimal.	  In	  addition,	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  is	  
cash	   and	   credit	   constrained,	   subsidies	   may	   be	   needed	   to	   ensure	   the	   widespread	   adoption	  
needed	  to	  prevent	  spillover.	  	  
The	  second	  category	  is	  health	  promotion	  campaigns	  aimed	  at	  behavioral	  change.	  These	  
campaigns	  are	   the	  mainstay	  of	  public	  health	   interventions	  and	   typically	   combine	   information	  
messaging	  with	  nudges	  such	  as	  helping	  develop	  specific	  plans,	  reminders,	  commitment	  devices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  subsidies	  on	  take-­‐up	  of	  health	  products	  and	  effect	  of	  having	  
health	  products	  on	  behavior.	  For	  example,	  subsidies	  increase	  the	  uptake	  of	  toilets	  (Pattanayak	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Having	  
soap	  and	  hot	  water	  in	  the	  house	  lowers	  the	  cost	  of	  hand	  washing	  (Luby	  et	  al.	  2004,	  Galiani	  et	  al	  2014).	  	  Storing	  
condoms	  on	  site	  lowers	  the	  cost	  of	  safe	  sex	  (Gertler	  et	  al	  2005).	  	  Owning	  a	  bednet	  already	  treated	  with	  insecticide	  
lowers	  the	  cost	  of	  malaria	  prevention	  (Cohen	  and	  Dupas	  2010,	  Cohen	  et	  al	  2014,	  Dupas	  2014a,	  Tarozzi	  et	  al.,	  
2014).	  	  Dispensing	  chlorine	  tablets	  at	  public	  water	  sources	  lowers	  the	  cost	  of	  accessing	  clean	  water	  (Ahuja	  et	  al,	  
2010).	  Owning	  a	  clean	  cook	  stove	  lowers	  the	  cost	  of	  reducing	  indoor	  air	  pollution	  (Bensch	  and	  Peters	  2012,	  Levine	  
et	  al.	  2013).	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and	   financial	   incentives	   (e.g.	  Ashraf	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  Thaler	  and	  Sunstein,	  2008,	  Giné	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  
Karlan	  et	  al,	  2012,	  Dupas	  and	  Robinson	  2013).	  	  Examples	  include	  campaigns	  to	  reduce	  smoking	  
and	  substance	  abuse	  cessation,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  improve	  nutrition	  and	  exercise,	  hygiene,	  safe	  sex,	  
etc.	  Health	  promotion	  campaigns	  work	   through	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms	   including	  providing	  
information	  on	  the	  return	  to	  the	  behavior,	  nudging	  better	  behavior	  that	  one	  already	  knows	  is	  in	  
her	   self-­‐interest,	   and	   encouraging	   households	   to	   invest	   in	   health	   products	   that	   lower	   the	  
marginal	  cost	  of	  good	  behavior.	  	  	  
The	   two	   approaches	   are	   based	   on	   very	   different	   views	   of	   the	   world.	   The	   subsidy	  
approach	   argues	   that	   households	   want	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   healthy	   behavior	   but	   are	   liquidity-­‐
constrained	  so	   that	   they	  are	  not	  able	   to	   invest	   in	   the	  health	  products	  necessary	   to	  make	   the	  
behavior	  convenient.	  Under	  this	  paradigm,	  once	  the	  family	  has	  invested	  in	  the	  health	  product,	  
the	   lower	   cost	   of	   the	   healthy	   behavior	   will	   facilitate	   the	   desired	   change	   in	   behavior.	   	   In	  
contrast,	   the	   health	   promotion	   approach	   considers	   that	   even	   if	   the	   behavior	   is	   convenient,	  
individuals	  will	  only	  engage	  in	  the	  behavior	  if	  one	  can	  change	  deep-­‐rooted	  habits	  and	  counter	  
prevailing	   social	   norms.	   If	   the	   primary	  mechanism	   through	  which	   health	   promotion	  works	   is	  
through	   encouraging	   investment	   in	   health	   products	   as	   opposed	   to	   overcoming	   norms	   and	  
habits,	  then	  it	  may	  be	  more	  effective	  to	  simply	  subsidize	  the	  purchase	  of	  products,	  especially	  in	  
the	   liquidity	   constrained	   cases	   where	   health	   promotion	   has	   limited	   effect	   on	   investment.	  
However	   in	   cases	   where	   health	   product	   subsidies	   are	   not	   enough,	   behavioral	   change	  
interventions	  may	  also	  be	  necessary	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
In	   this	   paper	   we	   report	   on	   the	   effects	   and	   mechanisms	   (behavioral	   change	   versus	  
investment)	  of	  health	  promotion	  campaigns	  designed	  to	  eliminate	  open	  defecation	  in	  at-­‐scale	  
randomized	   field	   experiments	   from	   four	   countries:	   India,	   Indonesia,	  Mali,	   and	   Tanzania.	   The	  
field	   experiments	   are	   at-­‐scale	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   interventions	   were	   designed	   and	  
implemented	   by	   governments	   as	   part	   of	   their	   national	   environmental	   health	   strategies,	   and	  
randomly	  rolled	  out	  geographically	  over	  time.	  The	  combination	  of	  at-­‐scale	  cluster	  randomized	  
field	  experiments	  with	  common	  measurement	  of	  outcomes	  in	  four	  countries	  provides	  not	  only	  
strong	  internal	  validity	  but	  also	  a	  degree	  of	  external	  validity	  not	  seen	  in	  most	  studies.	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Open	   defecation	   (OD)	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   a	   major	   cause	   of	   the	   persistent	   worldwide	  
burden	  of	  diarrhea	  and	  enteric	  parasite	  infection	  among	  children	  under	  5	  years	  old	  (Mara	  et	  al.,	  
2010).	  	  Open	  defecation	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  fecal	  contamination	  of	  water	  and	  food	  supplies	  and	  to	  
the	   transmission	   of	   soil-­‐borne	   helminthes	   (Chavasse	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   Reducing	   open	   defecation	  
requires	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  improved	  sanitation	  facilities,	  which	  are	  defined	  as	  facilities	  that	  
prevent	  human	  feces	  from	  re-­‐entering	  the	  environment.	  In	  2010,	  47%	  of	  the	  world	  population	  
did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  onsite	  improved	  sanitation	  facilities	  (UNICEF-­‐WHO,	  2012).	  Observational	  
studies	  of	   interventions	   that	  prevent	  human	   feces	   from	  entering	   the	  environment	  have	  been	  
shown	  to	  reduce	  diarrheal	  disease	   (Clasen	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  Norman	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  enteric	  parasite	  
infections	   (Barreto	   et	   al.,	   2010,	   Ziegelbauer	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   and	   child	   stunting	   and	   mortality	  
(Checkley	  et	  al.	  2004	  and	  2008,	  Humphrey	  2009,	  and	  Spears	  2012).	  	  
Given	   the	   large	   externalities	   associated	   with	   open	   defecation,	   families	   are	   only	   fully	  
protected	  if	  both	  they	  and	  their	  neighbors	  have	  access	  to	  and	  use	  improved	  sanitation	  facilities.	  
This	   has	   led	   to	   interventions	   that	   focus	   on	   the	   open	   defecation	   practices	   of	   the	   community,	  
rather	   than	   solely	   of	   the	   household.	   The	  most	   popular	   intervention	   is	   Community-­‐Led	   Total	  
Sanitation	   (CLTS),	   which	   informs	   communities	   and	   helps	   them	   to	   develop	   plans	   and	  
commitments	  to	  become	  100%	  open	  defecation	  free	  (Kar	  and	  Pasteur	  2005;	  Kar	  and	  Chambers,	  
2008).	   CLTS	   is	   intended	   to	   be	   participatory	   in	   nature	   and	   facilitates	   communities	   to	   take	   a	  
decisive	   role	   in	   ensuring	   that	   each	   and	   every	   member	   internalizes	   the	   implication	   of	   open	  
defecation	   (Sah	   &	   Negussie,	   2008).	   Pioneered	   in	   Bangladesh	   in	   1999,	   CLTS	   has	   been	  
implemented	   throughout	   Asia,	   Latin	   America,	   and	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   (Wells	   and	   Sijbesma,	  
2012).	  Despite	  this,	  a	  number	  of	  recent	  experimental	  reduced	  form	  studies	  have	  found	  mixed	  
results	  on	   the	   impact	  of	  CLTS	  on	  child	  health	  outcomes	   (Clausen	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Dickerson	  et	  al.	  
2014;	  Hammer	  and	  Spears	  2103;	  Patil	  et	  al.	  2014;	  and	  Wells	  and	  Sijbesma,	  2012).	  	  
While	  CLTS	  was	  the	  common	  core	  intervention	  in	  all	  four	  countries	  under	  study	  in	  this	  
paper,	   there	   were	   a	   number	   of	   important	   variations	   and	   additions.	   Indonesia,	   India,	   and	  
Tanzania	   additionally	   strengthened	   the	   private	   market	   availability	   of	   trained	   masons	   and	  
construction	  materials.	  The	  World	  Bank	  refers	  to	  the	  combined	  CLTS	  and	  strengthened	  private	  
sanitation	  market	   approach	   as	   Total	   Sanitation	   and	   Sanitation	  Marketing	   (TSSM)	   campaigns.	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India’s	  Total	  Sanitation	  Campaign	  (TSC)	  combined	  TSSM	  with	  additional	  subsidies	  for	  private	  in-­‐
home	  sanitation	  construction	  (toilet	  or	  latrine).	  While	  Mali	  was	  a	  pure	  CLTS	  intervention,	  it	  was	  
much	   more	   intensive	   than	   in	   the	   other	   countries,	   as	   they	   conducted	   12	   monthly	   visits	  
compared	  to	  the	  usual	  initial	  visit	  plus	  one	  follow-­‐up.	  The	  interventions	  are	  described	  in	  greater	  
detail	  in	  Section	  2.	  
The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  generated	  from	  cluster-­‐randomized	  interventions	  in	  all	  
four	   countries,	  where	   the	  unit	   of	   randomization	   is	   the	   village.	   In	   general,	   the	   samples	   for	   all	  
four	   countries	   are	   well	   balanced	   at	   baseline,	   have	   low	   levels	   of	   attrition,	   and	   show	   little	  
evidence	  of	  attrition	  bias.	  The	  details	  of	  the	  random	  assignment	  and	  sample	  are	  summarized	  in	  
Table	  1	  and	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  data	  appendix.	  
In	   Section	   3	   we	   derive	   an	   expression	   that	   decomposes	   the	   reduced	   form	   program	  
impact	   on	   open	   defecation	   into	   three	   terms:	   (1)	   investment	   in	   private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	  
facilities,	   (2)	   change	   in	   the	   open	   defecation	   behavior	   of	   families	   that	   have	   private	   in-­‐home	  
sanitation	  faculties,	  and	  (2)	  change	  in	  the	  behavior	  of	  families	  that	  do	  not	  have	  private	  in-­‐home	  
sanitation	   faculties	   and	   must	   use	   shared	   facilities.	   We	   then	   use	   the	   data	   from	   the	   field	  
experiments	  to	  estimate	  each	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  the	  decomposition.	  
The	   results	   suggest	   that	   the	   health	   promotion	   interventions	   produced	   significant	  
reductions	  in	  household	  and	  village	  open	  defecation	  rates	  in	  all	  four	  countries	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  to	  varying	  
degrees.	  The	  Mali	   intervention	  saw	  the	   largest	  reduction	   in	  open	  defecation;	  close	  to	  3-­‐times	  
the	   reduction	   of	   the	   next	   closest	   country.	   Moreover,	   Mali	   is	   the	   only	   country	   in	   which	   the	  
intervention	   succeeded	   in	   reducing	   open	   defecation	   by	   both	   households	   that	   did	   and	  
households	  that	  did	  not	  have	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  baseline.	  In	  the	  other	  three	  
countries,	  all	  of	  the	  behavioral	  change	  (reductions	   in	  open	  defecation)	  occurred	  exclusively	   in	  
the	  households	   that	  did	  not	  have	  private	   sanitation	   facilities	  at	  baseline.	   	   The	  more	  effective	  
results	   in	  Mali	   are	   likely	  due	   to	   the	  much	  more	   intensive	  CLTS	   intervention	   compared	   to	   the	  
other	  countries.	  	  
In	  Indonesia,	  Mali,	  and	  Tanzania,	  the	  health	  promotion	  campaigns	  worked	  both	  through	  
getting	  households	  to	  invest	  in	  in-­‐home	  private	  sanitation	  facilities	  and	  through	  increased	  use	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of	  private	  and	  shared	  sanitation	  facilities.	  However,	  in	  India,	  which	  combined	  a	  very	  light	  CLTS	  
with	  large	  subsidies	  for	  sanitation	  facility	  construction,	  all	  of	  the	  reduction	  in	  open	  defecation	  
was	   through	   the	   investment	   channel.	   Interestingly,	   households	   used	   new	   private	   in-­‐home	  
sanitation	  facilities	   less	   in	  countries	  where	  they	  were	  induced	  to	  build	  through	  the	  behavioral	  
change	  components	  of	  CLTS	  (i.e.	  Indonesia,	  Mali,	  and	  Tanzania)	  compared	  to	  India,	  where	  they	  
were	  induced	  to	  build	  through	  subsidies.	  	  
In	  Section	  4,	  we	  use	  experimentally	  induced	  variation	  in	  village	  OD	  rates	  to	  identify	  the	  
causal	  relationship	  between	  OD	  and	  child	  height.	  Surprisingly	  we	  find	  a	  fairly	  linear	  relationship.	  
We	  estimate	  that	  fully	  eliminating	  open	  defecation	  from	  a	  village	  where	  everyone	  defecates	  in	  
the	   open	   would	   increase	   child	   height	   by	   0.44	   standard	   deviations.	   Hence	   modest	   to	   small	  
reductions	   in	   open	   defecation	   are	   unlikely	   to	   have	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   child	   height	   and	  
explain	  why	  many	  health	  promotion	   interventions	  designed	  to	  reduce	  open	  defecation	   fail	   to	  
improve	   child	   height.	   Our	   results	   suggest	   that	   stronger	   interventions	   that	   combine	   intensive	  
health	  promotional	  nudges	  with	  subsidies	  for	  sanitation	  construction	  may	  be	  needed	  to	  reduce	  
open	  defecation	  enough	  to	  generate	  meaningful	  improvements	  in	  child	  health.	  
In	  the	  final	  section	  we	  use	  the	  results	  from	  the	  decomposition	  analysis	  to	  discuss	  how	  
interventions	   might	   be	   constructed	   to	   achieve	   large	   enough	   reductions	   in	   village	   open	  
defecation	  to	  generate	  meaningful	  improvements	  in	  child	  health.	  By	  far	  the	  biggest	  reductions	  
in	  open	  defecation	  come	   from	  households	  constructing	  private	   sanitation	   facilities.	   	   Installing	  
private	   sanitation	   has	   a	   much	   larger	   effect	   on	   open	   household	   defecation	   than	   any	   of	   the	  
behavioral	  change	  pathways.	  However,	   the	  effect	  on	  village	  open	  defection	  rates	  depends	  on	  
existing	   village-­‐level	   private	   sanitation	   coverage.	   Households	  may	   need	   substantial	   subsidies	  
and	  the	  effect	  of	  subsidies	  on	  village	  private	  sanitation	  coverage	  depends	  on	  the	  price	  elasticity	  
of	   demand.	   	   Even	   with	   very	   large	   subsidies,	   the	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   subsidizing	   private	  
sanitation	   construction	   by	   itself	   will	   not	   achieve	   sufficient	   reductions	   in	   village-­‐level	   open	  
defection	  rates	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  meaningful	  improvements	  in	  health	  outcomes.	  However,	  
it	  might	  be	  possible	   to	   achieve	   such	   levels	   by	   combining	   the	   intensive	  CLTS	  Mali	  model	  with	  
subsidies.	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2 INTERVENTIONS	  
The	  core	   intervention	   in	  all	   four	   countries	  was	  CLTS.2	  	  CLTS	  programs	  are	   community-­‐
targeted	   and	   community-­‐driven	   participatory	   campaigns	   designed	   to	   promote	   and	   improve	  
sanitation	   practices	   in	   rural	   areas	   (Kar	   and	   Chambers,	   2008).	   External	   facilitators	   are	   sent	   to	  
villages	   for	   a	   few	   days	   to	   lead	   graphic	   discussions	   of	   the	   community’s	   current	   sanitation	  
practices,	  the	  health	  consequences	  of	  such	  practices,	  and	  to	  facilitate	  collective	  action	  plans	  to	  
eliminate	  open	  defecation.	  The	  facilitated	  discussions	  are	  held	  in	  public	  places	  and	  are	  open	  to	  
all	  community	  members.	  They	  involve	  a	  “walk	  of	  shame,”	  where	  villagers	  are	  asked	  to	  provide	  a	  
tour	   indicating	   where	   people	   defecate.	   A	   map	   of	   the	   village	   is	   drawn	   on	   the	   ground	   and	  
villagers	  are	  asked	  to	  indicate	  where	  they	  live,	  where	  they	  defecate,	  and	  the	  routes	  they	  take	  
there	  and	  back.	  The	  facilitator	  then	  helps	  people	  analyze	  how	  fecal	  contamination	  is	  spreading	  
from	   the	   exposed	   excreta	   to	   their	   living	   environments	   and	   food	   and	   drinking	  water.	   It	   soon	  
becomes	  apparent	  that	  everyone	  is	  ingesting	  small	  amounts	  of	  each	  other’s	  feces.	  The	  premise	  
underlying	  the	  program	  approach	  is	  that	  this	  process	  prompts	  feelings	  of	  disgust	  that	  leads	  to	  
personal	  and	  collective	  desire	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  becoming	  an	  Open	  
Defecation	  Free	  (ODF)	  community.	  The	  community	  then	  is	  on	  its	  own	  to	  forge	  its	  own	  plan	  of	  
action	   with,	   at	   best,	   limited	   support	   from	   the	   program.	   	   The	   external	   facilitators	   somtimes	  
continue	  make	  followup	  visits	  to	  keep	  the	  community	  motivated	  and	  monitor	  their	  progress	  to	  
become	  the	  ODF	  community.	  
One	  of	   the	  key	  aspects	  of	  CLTS	   is	   to	  encourage	  households	   in	   the	  community	   to	  build	  
and	   use	   sanitation	   facilities	   that	   prevent	   fecal	  matter	   from	   re-­‐entering	   the	   environment	   and	  
flies	   from	   transmitting	   pathogens	   from	   the	   fecal	   matter	   to	   food	   and	   water	   that	   are	   later	  
ingested.	  While	  CLTS	  derived	  solutions	  could	  involve	  building	  shared	  toilets	  or	  public	  toilets,	  in	  
practice	  the	  main	  outcome	  has	  been	  to	  construct	  private	  in-­‐home,	  water-­‐flushed	  squat	  toilets	  
with	   drainage	   to	   a	   sealed	   pit.	   Households	   and	   communities	   are	   typically	   left	   to	   their	   own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Detailed	  information	  on	  the	  interventions	  and	  experimental	  designs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  in	  Cameron	  and	  Shah	  (2010)	  
and	  Cameron	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  for	  Indonesia	  TSSM,	  in	  Patil	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  for	  India	  TSC,	  f	  in	  Alzua	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  or	  Mali,	  and	  
in	  Briceño	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  for	  Tanzania.	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devices	  to	  finance	  and	  implement	  the	  construction	  of	  these	  facilities,	  as	  CLTS	  by	  itself	  typically	  
does	  not	  provide	  resources	  for	  this	  purpose.	  
While	  CLTS	  was	   the	  common	   intervention,	   there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  differences	  across	  
the	  four	  countries	  (See	  Table	  2).	  Indonesia,	  India,	  and	  Tanzania	  also	  included	  capacity	  building	  
of	   sanitation	  entrepreneurs	   in	  order	   to	   insure	   that	  households	  who	  want	   to	  build	  private	   in-­‐
home	   sanitation	   faculties	   are	   able	   to	   purchase	   the	   materials	   (i.e.	   cement)	   and	   hire	   trained	  
masons	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   construction	   (supply	   side).	   	   India	   additionally	   provided	   monetary	  
subsidies	   to	   households	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	   (demand	  
side).	  The	  amount	  of	   the	   Indian	  subsidy	  depends	  on	  whether	  a	  household	  was	  defined	   to	  be	  
Below	  Poverty	  Line	  (BPL)	  or	  Above	  the	  Poverty	  Line	  (APL).	  The	  program	  provided	  materials	  and	  
cash	  of	  Rs	  4200	  to	  Rs4700	  (US	  $84	  to	  $144)	  to	  BPL	  households	  and	  Rs	  2000	  to	  Rs	  5000	  (US	  $40	  
to	  $100)	  to	  non-­‐BPL	  households	  to	  support	  toilet	  construction.	   	  Finally,	  there	  were	  substantial	  
differences	   in	   the	   intensity	  of	   the	  CLTS.	   In	  Mali,	   facilitators	  visited	  communities	   first	   for	  CLTS	  
triggering	  and	  then	  monthly	  for	  one	  year	  to	  monitor	  activities	  and	  reinforce	  CLTS	  messaging.	  In	  
contrast,	   in	   Indonesia	  and	  Tanzania	   facilitators	  visited	  the	  communities	  only	  twice,	  once	  for	  a	  
triggering	   visit	   with	   a	   second	   follow-­‐up	   visit	   shortly	   thereafter	   to	   reinforce	   CLTS	   messaging.	  
India	  had	  the	  lightest	  CLTS	  intensity	  with	  only	  one	  visit	  for	  triggering	  and	  almost	  no	  follow-­‐up.	  
Compliance	  with	  the	  experimental	  design	  was	  not	  perfect	   (Table	  1).	   In	   Indonesia,	  only	  
66%	  of	  the	  villages	  assigned	  to	  treatment	  were	  triggered	  through	  CLTS	  activities	  (compliance),	  
while	   14%	   assigned	   to	   the	   control	   group	   also	   received	   the	   intervention	   (contamination).	  
Similarly,	  25%	  of	   the	  villages	   in	   India	  and	  10%	   in	  Mali	  assigned	   to	   the	  control	  group	   received	  
treatment.	   	   In	   the	   analyses	   below,	   we	   compare	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   group	   assigned	   to	  
treatment	  to	  the	  group	  assigned	  to	  control	  and	  therefore	  the	  results	  are	  interpreted	  as	  intent-­‐
to-­‐treat	  estimates.	  	  
3 OPEN	  DEFECATION	  
In	   this	   section	   we	   lay	   out	   a	   framework	   that	   decomposes	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   health	  
promotion	   intervention	  on	  OD	  into	  the	  contributions	  of	  behavioral	  and	   investment	  pathways.	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We	  then	  estimate	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  decomposition	  and	  use	  those	  estimates	  to	  assess	  the	  
relative	  contribution	  of	  each	  pathway.	  	  
3.1 Conceptual	  Framework	  
We	   begin	   by	   noting	   that	   an	   intervention	   differentially	   affects	   those	   households	   that	  
have	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  have	  existing	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	  For	  households	  
that	   have	   existing	   private	   sanitation	   facilities	   in	   their	   house,	   the	   only	   pathway	   is	   through	  
behavioral	  change,	  i.e.	  increased	  use	  of	  those	  facilities.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  families	  that	  do	  not	  have	  
existing	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation,	   an	   intervention	   can	   increase	   the	  use	  of	   shared	   (public	  or	  
private)	  facilities	  outside	  the	  house	  or	  cause	  households	  to	  invest	  in	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation.	  
The	  investment	  reduces	  the	  time	  and	  hassle	  or	  “transaction”	  cost	  of	  using	  sanitation	  facilities,	  
thereby	  increasing	  use	  of	  sanitation	  facilities.	  	  
We	  formalize	  this	  discussion	  as	  follows.	  Let	  𝜋 𝑂𝐷   be	  the	  probability	  of	  open	  defecation	  
and	  𝜋 𝑆 	  be	  the	  probability	  of	  having	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	  	  Then	  the	  probability	  
of	  open	  defecation	  can	  be	  written	  as	  the	  weighted	  sum	  of	  the	  conditional	  OD	  probabilities	  of	  
those	  with	  and	  without	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities:	  
	  
𝜋 𝑂𝐷 = 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 𝜋 𝑆 + 𝜋 0𝐷 𝑆 = 0 1− 𝜋 𝑆 	  	  	   .	   	   (1)	  
	  
In	   (1),	  𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 	  is	   the	  probability	  of	  OD	  conditional	  on	  having	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	  
facilities,	  and	  𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  OD	  conditional	  on	  not	  having	  private	  in-­‐home	  
sanitation	  facilities.	  
We	  obtain	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  pathways	  through	  which	  an	  intervention	  affects	  OD	  by	  
totally	  differentiating	  (1)	  and	  collecting	  terms:	  
	  
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 = 𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 𝜋 𝑆 + 𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 1− 𝜋 𝑆 +	  
	  
𝑑𝜋 𝑆 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 − 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 	  	  	   	  	   .	   (2)	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  change	  in	  the	  OD	  rate,	  then,	  is	  the	  weighted	  sum	  of	  the	  change	  in	  OD	  of	  those	  that	  have	  
private	  sanitation	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  have	  private	  sanitation,	  plus	  the	  change	   in	  the	  share	  
that	   have	   private	   sanitation,	   times	   the	   difference	   in	   OD	   of	   those	   that	   do	   and	   do	   not	   have	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private	   sanitation.	  The	   first	   two	   terms	  are	   the	  behavioral	  pathways	  and	   the	   third	   term	   is	   the	  
investment	  in	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  access	  to	  sanitation	  facilities.	  	  	  
We	  convert	  the	  decomposition	   into	  the	  share	  of	  the	  total	  change	  in	  OD	  accounted	  for	  
each	  of	  the	  three	  pathways	  by	  dividing	  both	  sides	  of	  (2)	  by	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 :	  
	  
1 =
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 𝜋 𝑆
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 +
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 1− 𝜋 𝑆
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 +	  
	  
𝑑𝜋 𝑆 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 − 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 	  
	  
3.2 Total	  Impact	  and	  Behavioral	  Change	  With	  Existing	  Private	  In-­‐Home	  Sanitation	  
We	   obtain	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 and  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1    in	   equation	   (2)	   by	   estimating	   the	   following	  
regression	  for	  all	  households,	  and	  for	  households	  that	  have	  existing	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  
facilities	  at	  baseline	  respectively:	  
	  
𝑂𝐷!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇!" + 𝛾!𝑅!! +𝜖!" 	   	   ,	   	   	   (3)	  
	   	  
where	  𝑂𝐷!"#	  is	  the	  OD	  rate	  of	  household	  i	  in	  village	  j	  in	  randomization	  strata	  k,	  𝑇! 	  takes	  on	  the	  
value	  one	  if	  village	  j	  in	  randomization	  strata	  k	  was	  assigned	  to	  treatment,	  and	  𝑅!	  takes	  on	  the	  
value	  one	  if	  village	  j	  was	  in	  stratum	  k.	  	  
The	  parameters	  in	  (3)	  are	  identified	  off	  the	  random	  assignment	  using	  the	  endline	  data.	  	  
The	  samples	  are	  well	  balanced	  across	  control	  and	  treatment	  groups	  for	  all	  households	  as	  well	  
as	   for	   the	  sub-­‐samples	  of	  households	  with	  existing	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	   facilities	  and	   for	   those	  
that	   do	  not	  have	  private	   facilities	   (Appendix	   Tables	  A1-­‐A4).	   The	  estimates	   are	   intent-­‐to-­‐treat	  
(ITT)	   parameters	   that	   compare	   the	   outcomes	   of	   households	   in	   those	   villages	   to	   which	   the	  
program	  was	  assigned	  to	  be	  offered	  with	  control	  villages	  that	  were	  assigned	  not	  to	  be	  offered	  
the	  program.	  We	  cluster	  the	  standard	  errors	  at	  the	  village	  level.	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  an	  intensity	  measure	  of	  open	  defecation.	  The	  household	  was	  
asked	   separately	   for	   men,	   women,	   and	   children	   if	   they	   defecated	   in	   the	   open	   always,	  
sometimes,	  or	  never.	   	  We	  coded	  the	  answers	  2	  for	  always,	  1	  for	  sometimes,	  and	  0	  for	  never.	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We	  then	  summed	  the	  answers	  for	  the	  3	  types	  of	  household	  members.	  The	  values	  ranged	  from	  
0	  to	  6.	   	  We	  then	  divided	  by	  6	   in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  measure	  of	  OD	  intensity	  between	  0	  and	  1,	  
where	  0	  indicates	  no	  open	  defecation	  and	  1	  indicates	  always	  open	  defecate.	  	  
Table	  3	  presents	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  program	  on	  households’	  defecation	  
behavior	  for	  Indonesia,	  India,	  Mali,	  and	  Tanzania.	  The	  first	  column	  reports	  estimates	  of	  𝑑𝜋 𝐷 ,	  
the	  impact	  of	  treatment	  on	  open	  defecation	  for	  all	  households.	  We	  find	  negative	  effects	  in	  all	  
four	   countries,	   of	   which	   three	   are	   statistically	   significant	   at	   conventional	   levels.	   The	   largest	  
effects	  are	  in	  Mali	  where	  the	  CLTS	  nudging	  was	  the	  most	  intensive.	  There	  we	  find	  that	  the	  OD	  
rate	   fell	   by	   0.33,	   which,	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   control	   group	   means,	   amounts	   to	   a	   58%	  
reduction	  in	  overall	  OD.	  	  Next	  highest	  is	  Tanzania	  where	  OD	  rates	  fell	  by	  0.13,	  a	  54%	  reduction	  
in	  OD	  compared	  to	  the	  control	  group.	  	  The	  relative	  effects	  in	  Mali	  and	  Tanzania	  are	  about	  the	  
same	  because	  the	  OD	  rate	  in	  the	  control	  group	  in	  Tanzania	  (0.23)	  is	  less	  than	  half	  of	  that	  in	  Mali	  
(0.57).	  	  In	  India	  and	  Indonesia	  the	  effects	  sizes	  are	  substantially	  smaller	  at	  less	  than	  10%.	  
In	  the	  second	  column	  of	  Table	  3	  we	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  sample	  of	  households	  that	  
had	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  at	  baseline,	  which	  provides	  us	  with	  estimates	  of	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 .	  
In	  3	  out	  of	   the	  4	   countries,	   there	  was	  effectively	  no	   impact	  of	   treatment	  on	   the	  OD	   rates	  of	  
households	   that	  had	  existing	   in-­‐home	  private	  sanitation	   faculties.	   	   In	   Indonesia	  and	  Tanzania,	  
this	  effect	  is	  most	  likely	  driven	  by	  the	  very	  low	  OD	  rates	  among	  these	  households	  to	  begin	  with.	  
However,	  the	  OD	  rates	  among	  households	  with	  existing	  private	  sanitation	  are	  nontrivial	  in	  India	  
and	  Mali.	  While	  treatment	  had	  a	  large	  negative	  effect	  on	  this	  group	  in	  Mali,	  it	  had	  no	  impact	  in	  
India.	   This	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   more	   intensive	   behavioral	   change	   intervention	   in	   Mali	  
compared	  to	  India.	  
Finally,	   in	  the	   last	  column	  we	  report	  estimates	  for	  those	  households	  that	  did	  not	  have	  
private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	   at	   baseline.	   	   These	   estimates	   are	   a	   combination	   of	   the	  
investment	  effect	  and	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  shared	  non-­‐private	  sanitation	  facilities	  among	  those	  
who	  chose	  not	  to	  construct.	  While	  not	  providing	  information	  for	  the	  decomposition	  in	  equation	  
(2),	  the	  results	  are	  interesting	  because,	  except	  for	  Mali,	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  overall	  reduction	  in	  OD	  
comes	   from	   these	   households.	   In	   all	   countries,	   the	   estimated	   treatment	   effects	   are	  
substantially	  larger	  than	  those	  for	  households	  with	  existing	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	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The	  treatment	  effect	  on	  households	  with	  no	  private	  sanitation	  is	  a	  reduction	  in	  open	  defecation	  
by	  10%	  in	  Indonesia,	  8%	  in	  India,	  57%	  in	  Mali,	  and	  45%	  in	  Tanzania.	  
3.3 Investment	  in	  Sanitation	  Facilities	  	  
We	   obtain	  𝑑𝜋 𝑆   from	   the	   following	   regression	   specification	   using	   endline	   data	   for	  
households	  that	  did	  not	  have	  existing	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  baseline:	  
	  
𝑆!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇!" + 𝛾!𝑅!! +𝜖!" 	   	   ,	   	   	   (4)	  
	   	  
where	  𝑆!"#	  takes	  on	  the	  value	  1	  if	  household	  i	  in	  village	  j	  in	  randomization	  strata	  k	  has	  access	  to	  
sanitation	   facilities	   at	   endline.	  We	   consider	   three	   sanitation	   outcomes	   including	   (i)	   access	   to	  
any	   sanitation	   facilities,	   (ii)	   access	   to	   private	   in-­‐home	   facilities	   and	   (iii)	   access	   to	   shared	   or	  
public	  facilities	  outside	  the	  home.	  The	  estimate	  𝑑𝜋 𝑆   is	  the	  impact	  of	  treatment	  on	  private	  in-­‐
home	   facilities.	   Again,	   the	   estimates	   in	   (4)	   are	   identified	   off	   the	   random	   assignment	   for	   the	  
sample	   of	   households	   that	   did	   not	   have	   private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	   at	   baseline,	   are	  
intent-­‐to-­‐treat	  (ITT)	  parameters,	  and	  the	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  village	  level.	  
The	  first	  column	  of	  Table	  4	  reports	  estimates	  the	  impact	  of	  treatment	  on	  access	  to	  any	  
sanitation	  facilities.	  	  We	  see	  statistically	  significant	  positive	  effects	  in	  all	  4	  countries.	  Again,	  the	  
largest	  impact	  is	  in	  Mali	  where	  sanitation	  access	  increased	  by	  39	  percentage	  points,	  an	  increase	  
of	  267%	  over	  the	  control	  group.	  	  The	  next	  highest	  impact	  was	  in	  India	  where	  access	  increased	  
by	  21	  percentage	  points,	  an	  increase	  of	  166%	  over	  the	  control	  group.	  	  The	  impacts	  of	  treatment	  
on	  access	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Tanzania	  were	  more	  modest	  amounting	  to	  47%	  and	  19%	  increases,	  
respectively.	   	   Except	   in	   Indonesia,	   all	   of	   the	   increases	   in	   access	   to	   sanitation	   came	   through	  
construction	  of	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	   In	   Indonesia	  about	  half	  of	  the	   increase	   in	  
sanitation	  access	  came	  from	  expanded	  use	  of	  shared	  out-­‐of-­‐home	  facilities.	  	  
3.4 Behavioral	  Change	  Without	  Existing	  Private	  In-­‐Home	  Sanitation	  
Finally,	  we	  turn	  to	  estimating	  the	  remaining	  two	  parameters	  associated	  with	  those	  that	  
did	   not	   have	  private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	   at	   baseline.	   The	   first,	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 ,	   is	   the	  
impact	   of	   treatment	   on	   the	   use	   of	   shared	   out-­‐of-­‐home	   facilities,	   and	   the	   second,	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𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 − 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 ,	   is	  the	  impact	  of	   installing	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  
on	  OD.	  	  	  
We	   estimate	   these	   parameters	   using	   the	   regression	   specified	   below	   for	   the	   sample	  
households	  that	  did	  not	  have	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  baseline:3	  
	  
𝑂𝐷!"# = 𝜆! + 𝜆!𝑇! + 𝜆!𝑆! + 𝜆!𝑇!𝑆! + 𝛾!𝑅!! + 𝜀!"#	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (5)	  
	  
where	  𝑆! 	  is	  an	  indicator	  of	  having	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  endline.	  The	  coefficient	  
on	  treatment,	  𝜆!,	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  OD	  of	  families	  that	  do	  not	  have	  private	  in-­‐
home	   sanitation	   facilities	   in	   treatment	   versus	   control	   communities	   and	   is	   our	   estimate	   of	  
𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 .	  The	  coefficient	  on	  𝑆!,	  𝜆!,	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  OD	  of	  families	  that	  
build	  sanitation	  facilities	  to	  those	  that	  do	  not	  in	  control	  communities.	  And	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  
interaction	  of	   treatment	  and	  sanitation	   facilities,	  𝜆!,	   is	  an	  estimate	  of	   the	  difference	   in	  OD	  of	  
families	   that	   build	   sanitation	   facilities	   in	   treatment	   versus	   control	   communities.	   Hence,	   our	  
estimate	  of	   𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 − 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0   is	  𝜆! + 𝜆!.	  	  
	   Unlike	   the	   previous	   estimates,	   the	   parameters	   in	   (5)	   are	   not	   identified	   purely	   off	   the	  
randomized	  experiments.	  A	  major	  concern	  is	  that	  private	   in-­‐home	  sanitation	  construction	  is	  a	  
choice	  and	  might	  be	  correlated	  with	  other	  characteristics	  that	  also	  drive	  open	  defecation	  such	  
as	  wealth,	  education	  and	  preferences	  for	  hygiene	  and	  health.	  To	   investigate	  how	  much	  other	  
characteristics	  might	  be	  driving	  our	  results,	  we	  estimate	  a	  second	  set	  of	  models	  that	  include	  a	  
series	   of	   variables	  measured	   at	   baseline	   to	   control	   for	   differences	   in	   wealth,	   education	   and	  
preferences.	  In	  all	  4	  countries	  we	  control	  for	  the	  head’s	  years	  of	  schooling,	  family	  composition,	  
knowledge	   that	   open	   defecation	   causes	   diarrhea,	   whether	   the	   household	   believes	   open	  
defecation	  is	  acceptable,	  income	  or	  wealth	  per	  capita,	  and	  for	  Indonesia	  we	  additionally	  control	  
for	   risk	   preferences	   and	   time	   discount	   rates.	   	   The	   detailed	   list	   of	   control	   variables	   for	   each	  
country	  is	  listed	  in	  the	  table	  notes	  of	  Table	  5.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	  This	  specification	  is	  essentially	  a	  version	  of	  the	  Blinder	  (1973)	  and	  Oaxaca	  (1973)	  decomposition	  of	  a	  treatment	  
effect	  into	  its	  pathways.	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   We	  report	  results	   from	  the	  estimation	  of	  equation	  (5)	  without	  any	  controls	   in	  Panel	  A	  
and	  with	  controls	  Panel	  B	  in	  Table	  5.	  	  We	  note	  that	  the	  point	  estimates	  are	  almost	  identical	  in	  
the	  models	  and	  without	  controls	  allowing	  us	  to	  cautiously	  interpret	  these	  estimates	  as	  causal.	  
	   The	  first	  parameter	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  coefficient	  on	  treatment,	  λ!,	  which	  is	  the	  estimate	  
of	  dπ OD S = 0 .	   The	   coefficient	   is	   negative	   and	   statistically	   significant	   in	   3	   out	   of	   four	  
countries	  consistent	  with	  treatment	  increasing	  the	  use	  of	  shared	  sanitation	  facilities	  outside	  of	  
the	   home.	   However,	   the	   estimated	   effect	   in	   Mali	   is	   substantially	   larger	   than	   in	   the	   other	  
countries	  consistent	  with	  the	  behavioral	  change	  intervention	  being	  substantially	  more	  intensive	  
in	  Mali	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  countries.	  Only	   in	   India	  was	  there	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  defecation	  
practices	   of	   family	   without	   private	   facilities	   again	   consistent	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   public	   or	  
community	   toilets	  were	  not	  constructed,	   the	  behavior	   change	  and	  subsidies	  both	   focused	  on	  
building	  and	  using	  in-­‐home	  private	  toilets.	   	  
	   The	  coefficient	  on	  S!,	  λ!,	  is	  negative,	  large,	  and	  statistically	  significant	  in	  all	  4	  countries.	  	  
The	   point	   estimates	   are	   large	   suggesting	   that	   the	   installation	   of	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	  
greatly	   reduces	   OD.	   Lowering	   the	   time	   and	   hassle	   cost	   of	   use	   of	   sanitation	   facilities	   greatly	  
reduces	  open	  defecation.	  In	  3	  out	  of	  the	  four	  countries	  the	  point	  estimates	  are	  very	  similar;	  The	  
installation	  of	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  reduces	  OD	  rates	  by	  about	  0.3.	  	  In	  Indonesia,	  
the	  point	  estimate	  is	  about	  twice	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  other	  countries.	  	  
	   The	   coefficient	   on	   the	   interaction	   of	   treatment	   and	  S!,	  λ!,	   is	   positive	   and	   statistically	  
significant	  in	  Mali.	  In	  addition,	  though	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  it	  is	  positive	  and	  non-­‐trivial	  in	  
Indonesia	   and	   Tanzania.	   Only	   in	   India	   is	   the	   coefficient	   both	   not	   statistically	   significant	   and	  
small	  in	  magnitude.	  The	  largest	  effect	  (0.15)	  is	  in	  Mali,	  which	  had	  the	  strongest	  behavioral	  CLTS	  
intervention	  followed	  by	  Indonesia	  (0.11)	  and	  Tanzania	  (0.06),	  which	  had	  a	  weaker	  behavioral	  
CLTS	   intervention	   and	   combined	   CLTS	   with	   improvements	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   sanitation	  
installation.	  The	  smallest	  effect	  was	  in	  India	  (0.001),	  which	  combined	  the	  weaker	  CLTS	  approach	  
with	   large	   subsidies	   for	   sanitation	   installation.	   	   This	   suggests	   that	   households	   that	   were	  
convinced	  by	  the	  CLTS	  health	  promotion	  to	  install	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  use	  them	  
less	   than	   those	  who	   installed	   them	  without	   the	  nudge,	  whereas	   there	   is	  no	  difference	   in	  use	  
when	  subsidies	  were	  the	  primary	  incentive	  to	  install	  the	  facilities.	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3.5 Decomposition	  	  
We	  now	  use	  these	  parameter	  estimates	  to	  decompose	  the	  change	   in	  open	  defecation	  
into	  the	  following	  behavioral	  and	  investment	  pathways	  based	  on	  equation	  (2):	  
	  
(i)	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 𝜋 𝑠 	  =	  change	  in	  OD	  by	  those	  with	  private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  (behavioral)	  
(ii)	  𝑑𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0 1− 𝜋 𝑠 	  =	  change	  in	  OD	  by	  those	  without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  (behavioral)	  
(iii)	  𝑑𝜋 𝑆 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 1 − 𝜋 𝑂𝐷 𝑆 = 0   =	  change	  in	  OD	  due	  to	  investment	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  (investment)	  
	  
The	   decomposition	   results	   are	   presented	   in	   Table	   6.	   In	   3	   out	   of	   4	   countries,	   the	  
behavioral	  pathways	  (i.e.	  increased	  used	  of	  sanitation	  facilities)	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  
the	   reduction	   in	  open	  defection	  obtained	   from	  the	   intervention.	   	  Only	   in	   India	  was	  all	  of	   the	  
change	  (100%)	  due	  to	  investment	  in	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	  This	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  India	  is	  the	  only	  country	  that	  had	  subsidies	  for	  construction.	  	  	  
In	   the	   3	   countries	  where	   behavioral	   change	  was	   important,	   only	   in	  Mali	   was	   there	   a	  
significant	  behavioral	  change	  among	  those	  who	  had	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities,	  while	  
in	   Indonesia	  and	  Tanzania	  the	  behavioral	  change	  was	  concentrated	   in	  households	  without	   in-­‐
home	  facilities	  by	   increasing	  use	  of	  shared	  out-­‐of-­‐home	  sanitation	   facilities.	  This	   is	  consistent	  
with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CLTS	  component	  was	  much	  more	  intensive	  in	  Mali	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  
countries.	  
4 CHILD	  HEALTH	  
	  
Promotion	  of	  healthy	  behaviors	  and	  in	  particular	  reducing	  open	  defecation	  is	  designed	  
to	   improve	  health	  outcomes.	  Open	  defecation	   leads	   to	   the	   fecal	   contamination	  of	  water	  and	  
food	   supplies	   and	   to	   the	   transmission	   of	   soil	   borne	   helminthes	   (Chavasse	   et	   al.,	   1999).	  	  
Gastrointestinal	  pathogenic	  infections	  consume	  micronutrients,	  cause	  diarrhea,	  and	  reduce	  the	  
absorption	   of	   nutrition	   in	   general,	   leading	   to	   retarded	   growth	   and	   development	   in	   young	  
children.	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In	  this	  section,	  we	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  reductions	   in	  open	  defecation	   improved	  
child	  health	  outcomes	  measured	  by	  height	  of	  children	  less	  than	  5	  at	  endline,	  an	  age	  at	  which	  
height	  is	  sensitive	  to	  parasitic	  infections,	  diarrhea,	  and	  illness	  in	  general.	  We	  construct	  height-­‐
for-­‐age	  z-­‐scores,	  which	  place	  the	  child’s	  height	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  well-­‐nourished	  reference	  
population	  for	  her	  age.	  We	  use	  a	  standardized	  age-­‐	  and	  gender-­‐specific	  growth	  reference	  based	  
on	  WHO	  standards	  (2006,	  2007).	  	  
We	  measure	  OD	  at	  the	  village	   level	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  household	   level	  since	  a	  family’s	  
protection	  from	  the	  pathogens	  spread	  through	  OD	  depends	  on	  both	  their	  own	  behavior	  and	  the	  
behavior	   of	   their	   neighbors.	   	   Eliminating	   their	   own	   OD	   will	   have	   limited	   protection	   if	   their	  
neighbors	  continue	  to	  practice	  OD.	  	  
4.1 Empirical	  Specification	  	  
Our	   empirical	   approach	   is	   based	   on	   the	   health	   capital	   model	   originally	   proposed	   in	  
Grossman	  (1972)	  that	  specifies	  health	  as	  stock	  that	  accumulates	  as	  a	  function	  of	  investment:	  
𝐻! = 𝐼! + 1− 𝛿 𝐻!!! + 𝜀!	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (6)	  
In	   (6)	  𝐻!	  is	   the	   stock	   of	   health	   capital	   in	   period	   t,	  𝐼!	  is	   investment	   in	   health	   capital	   such	   as	  
nutrition,	  prevention	  and	  curative	  medical	  care,	  and	  prevention	  activities	  such	  as	  exercise,	  safe	  
water	  and	  sanitation;  𝛿	  is	  the	  depreciation	  rate,	  and	  𝜀!	  is	  a	  shock	  to	  health	  in	  period	  t.	  	  	  
The	   general	   approach	   will	   be	   to	   replace	  𝐼!	  with	  measures	   of	   village	   levels	   of	   OD	   and	  
estimate	  an	  equation	  of	  the	  following	  form:	  
𝐻!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂𝐷!! + 𝛾𝐻!"#!! + 𝜀!"#	  	   	   	   	   	   (7)	  
Where	  𝑂𝐷!"	  is	  the	  open	  defecation	  rate	  in	  village	  j	  in	  period	  t.	  By	  conditioning	  on	  lagged	  𝐻!!!,	  
𝛽 is	  interpreted	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  village	  OD	  on	  child	  growth	  between	  the	  2	  periods.	  
4.2 Variation	  in	  Village	  Open	  Defecation	  Rates	  
In	   the	   analysis	   above	   we	   demonstrated	   at	   the	   household	   level	   that	   the	   effect	   of	  
treatment	   on	   household	   level	   OD	   depends	   on	   whether	   the	   household	   had	   private	   in-­‐home	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sanitation	   at	   baseline.	   Therefore,	   the	   effect	   of	   treatment	   on	   village	   OD	   rates	   should	   vary	  
depending	  on	  village	  private	  sanitation	  coverage	  at	  baseline.	  	  
Figure	   1	   presents	   the	   distributions	   of	   village-­‐level	   private	   sanitation	   rates	   at	   baseline	  
and	   shows	   substantial	   heterogeneity	   both	   within	   and	   between	   countries.	   We	   restrict	   this	  
analysis	  to	  the	  3	  countries	  for	  which	  we	  have	  data	  on	  child	  height	  both	  at	  baseline	  and	  follow-­‐
up:	  India,	  Indonesia	  and	  Mali.	  India	  had	  by	  far	  the	  lowest	  baseline	  sanitation	  coverage,	  with	  the	  
majority	  of	  villages	  having	  less	  than	  20%	  of	  households	  with	  private	  sanitation.	   Indonesia	  had	  
the	  highest	  coverage	  rates,	  with	  Mali	  in	  between	  India	  and	  Indonesia.	  
The	   difference	   in	   baseline	   village	   sanitation	   did	   indeed	   result	   in	   substantial	  
heterogeneity	  in	  village-­‐level	  OD	  rates.	  In	  Figure	  2,	  we	  present	  the	  distributions	  of	  village-­‐level	  
OD	  rates	  by	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups.	  Overall	   in	  Panel	  A,	  there	  was	  a	  substantial	  shift	   in	  
villages	   from	   the	   top	   3	   quintiles	   to	   the	   bottom	   two	   quintiles	   and	   especially	   to	   the	   lowest	  
quintile	   in	  OD	  rates.	   	   In	   India	   (Panel	  B),	   the	  shift	  was	   from	  the	  highest	  quintile	   to	   the	  middle	  
quintile.	   In	   Indonesia	   (Panel	   C),	   the	   shift	  was	   from	  middle	   3	   quintiles	   to	   the	   lowest	   quintile.	  
Finally,	  in	  Mali	  (Panel	  D),	  the	  shift	  was	  from	  the	  top	  3	  quintiles	  to	  the	  bottom	  2	  quintiles.	  
4.3 The	  Impact	  of	  Village	  Open	  Defection	  on	  Child	  Height	  
In	  this	  section	  we	  estimate	  the	  causal	  relationship	  between	  village	  OD	  and	  child	  height	  
exploiting	   the	   experimentally	   induced	   variation	   in	   village	  OD	   for	   identification.	   To	   do	   so,	  we	  
pool	  the	  data	  from	  the	  3	  countries	  for	  which	  we	  have	  data	  on	  child	  height	  both	  at	  baseline	  and	  
follow-­‐up:	  India,	  Indonesia	  and	  Mali.	  The	  analysis	  sample	  includes	  5600	  observations	  from	  318	  
villages.	  
We	   first	   estimate	   the	   association	   between	   child	   height	   z-­‐scores	   and	   village-­‐level	   OD	  
non-­‐parametrically	  using	  Lowess	  regression	  (Figure	  3).	  The	  relationship	   is	  negative,	   i.e.	  height	  
for	  age	  z-­‐scores	  fall	  as	  the	  village	  OD	  rises,	  and	  the	  95-­‐degree	  confidence	  regions	  are	  very	  tight.	  
Remarkably,	   the	   relationship	   appears	   to	   be	   linear	   suggesting	   that	   there	   is	   no	   threshold	   that	  
needs	  to	  be	  achieved	  to	  obtain	  health	  benefits.	  
	   We	  estimate	  (7)	  by	  IV	  GMM	  using	  the	  pooled	  data	  both	  with	  and	  without	  individual	  and	  
household	  socio-­‐economic	  controls.	  The	  individual	  and	  household	  level	  controls	  are	  entered	  as	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interactions	  with	  an	   indicator	  variable	  for	  the	  country	   in	  which	  the	  child	   lives.	  We	  instrument	  
for	  𝑂𝐷!"	  using	   randomized	   treatment	   assignment	   status	   of	   the	   village	   and	   an	   interaction	   of	  
assignment	  status	  and	  the	  baseline	  level	  of	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  coverage	  in	  the	  village;	  i.e.	  the	  
share	  of	  households	  that	  had	  private	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  baseline.	  From	  the	  analysis	  
above	   the	   overall	   effect	   of	   treatment	   on	   households	   varies	   by	   whether	   the	   household	   had	  
sanitation	  at	  baseline.	  Therefore,	  the	  effect	  of	  treatment	  on	  village	  OD	  should	  vary	  by	  the	  share	  
of	  households	  that	  had	  sanitation	  facilities	  at	  baseline.	  Again,	  we	  interact	  the	  instruments	  with	  
country	  indicators,	  thus	  giving	  us	  6	  instruments.	  	  
The	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  7.	  The	  estimated	  effects	  are	  statistically	  significant	  for	  
all	   of	   the	   models.	   The	   Kleeberg-­‐Pop	   F-­‐statistics	   from	   the	   first	   stage	   are	   large	   and	   the	  
instruments	  are	  statistically	  significant	  for	  5	  out	  of	  the	  6	  variables	  (Panel	  B).	  Interestingly,	  the	  IV	  
estimates	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   Village	  OD	   on	   height	   are	   relatively	   close	   in	  magnitude	   to	   the	  OLS	  
estimates	   (Panel	   A).	   In	   addition,	   while	   adding	   controls	   lowers	   the	   estimated	   impact,	   the	  
reduction	   is	   relatively	   small.	   The	  estimated	   slope	  means	   that	   fully	  eliminating	  OD	   in	  a	   village	  
where	  everyone	  practices	  OD	  would	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  0.44	  standard	  deviation	   increase	   in	  
height.	  Another	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  results	  is	  a	  one	  standard	  deviation	  reduction	  in	  the	  open	  
defecation	  index	  (0.47)	  would	  yield	  about	  a	  0.22	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  height.	  	  
The	  results	  have	  different	  implications	  for	  each	  of	  the	  countries	  depending	  on	  baseline	  
OD	  rates.	  	  The	  biggest	  potential	  gains	  are	  in	  India	  where	  baseline	  village	  OD	  rates	  are	  0.86.	  	  In	  
this	   case,	   reducing	   OD	   by	   half	   would	   yield	   about	   a	   0.4	   standard	   deviation	   in	   height.	   	   In	  
Indonesia	  and	  Mali,	  where	  baseline	  village	  OD	  rates	  are	  0.41	  and	  0.56	  respectively,	  one	  would	  
have	  to	  virtually	  eliminate	  OD	  to	  achieve	  similar	  levels	  of	  improvement	  in	  height.	  Finally,	  even	  
though	   it	  was	  not	   included	   in	   the	  estimation,	   eliminating	  OD	   in	  Tanzania	  would	  yield	  at	  best	  
modest	  gains	  in	  height	  as	  baseline	  village	  OD	  rates	  are	  only	  0.23.	  	  
4.4 Average	  Treatment	  Effects	  	  
The	   above	   results	   explain	   in	   part	   the	   mixed	   results	   of	   the	   estimates	   of	   average	  
treatment	  effects	  of	  CLTS	  based	  interventions	  on	  child	  height	  in	  the	  literature.	  We	  estimate	  the	  
average	  treatment	  effects	  of	  the	  interventions	  on	  height	  using	  a	  version	  of	  equation	  (6)	  where	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the	   investment	   is	   the	   reduction	   in	   open	   defecation	   at	   the	   village	   level	   generated	   by	   the	  
interventions.	  	  	  
𝐻!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇!" + 𝛾𝐻!"#!! + 𝜀!"#	  	   	   	   	   	   (8)	  
Where	  𝑇!"	  takes	  on	  the	  value	  one	  if	  village	  j	  received	  the	  intervention	  in	  period	  t.	  In	  this	  case,	  𝛽	  
is	  the	  ITT	  estimate	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  treatment	  in	  child	  height.	  
In	  Table	  8	  we	  present	  the	  results.	  The	  estimated	  average	  treatment	  effects	  on	  height	  in	  
India	  and	  Indonesia	  were	  small	  and	  not	  significant,	  whereas	  in	  Mali	  the	  estimated	  effect	  size	  is	  
0.17	   standard	  deviations.	   In	   India,	   Indonesia	  and	  Tanzania	   the	   interventions	   reduced	  average	  
village	   OD	   rates	   by	   0.03,	   0.09	   and	   0.12	   respectively;	   not	   enough	   to	   achieve	   measureable	  
improvements	  in	  height.	  In	  contrast	  in	  Mali,	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  on	  OD	  is	  0.33,	  close	  
to	  3-­‐times	  higher	  than	  any	  of	  the	  other	  countries.	  
5 DISCUSSION	  
This	   paper	   examines	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   health	   promotional	   nudges	   work	   through	  
investment	   in	   health	   products	   that	   lower	   the	   marginal	   cost	   of	   good	   behavior	   or	   through	  
behavioral	   change	   using	   those	   products	   more	   than	   otherwise.	   The	   results	   address	   whether	  
subsidies	   for	   health	   products	   are	   enough	   or	   whether	   nudges	   to	   use	   health	   products	   are	  
necessary	   to	   change	   behavior	   sufficiently	   to	   improve	   health	   outcomes.	   Subsidies	   would	   be	  
sufficient	  if	  households	  are	  simply	  liquidity	  constrained	  and	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  save	  enough	  
or	  borrow	  to	  be	  able	  to	  build	  toilets.	  However,	  if	  open	  defecation	  is	  a	  deep-­‐rooted	  habit	  that	  is	  
culturally	  acceptable,	  then	  simply	  encouraging	  people	  to	  build	  toilets	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  get	  
people	  to	  use	  them.	  	  
We	  reported	  on	  the	  effects	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  health	  promotion	  campaigns	  designed	  
to	   eliminate	   open	   defecation	   in	   at-­‐scale	   randomized	   field	   experiments	   in	   4	   countries:	   India,	  
Indonesia,	   Mali,	   and	   Tanzania.	   The	   field	   experiments	   are	   at-­‐scale	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  
interventions	   were	   designed	   and	   implemented	   by	   governments	   as	   part	   of	   their	   national	  
environmental	   health	   strategies,	   and	   randomly	   rolled	   out	   geographically	   over	   time.	   The	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combination	  of	  at-­‐scale	   randomized	   field	  experiments	   in	  4	  countries	  provides	  not	  only	  strong	  
internal	  validity	  but	  also	  a	  degree	  of	  external	  validity	  not	  seen	  in	  most	  studies.	  
We	  find	  evidence	  that	   in	  3	  of	   the	  4	  countries	  a	   large	  portion	  of	  the	  reduction	   in	  open	  
defecation	   came	   through	   behavioral	   change,	   i.e.	   increased	   use	   of	   sanitation	   facilities,	   as	  
opposed	  to	  investing	  in	  in-­‐home	  sanitation	  facilities.	  The	  more	  intensive	  the	  health	  promotion	  
the	  larger	  was	  the	  behavioral	  mechanism	  relative	  to	  the	  investment	  mechanism.	  Interestingly,	  
households	   used	   new	   private	   in-­‐home	   sanitation	   facilities	   less	   in	   countries	  where	   they	  were	  
induced	  to	  build	  through	  shaming	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  they	  were	  induced	  to	  build	  through	  
subsidies.	  Only	   in	   India,	  where	   the	  primary	   intervention	  was	   subsidies	   for	   construction	  of	   in-­‐
home	  facilities,	  was	  all	  of	  the	  effect	  achieved	  through	  investment.	   	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  
there	  may	  be	  gains	  to	  combining	  behavioral	  nudges	  on	  top	  of	  health	  product	  subsidies	  and	  that	  
the	  intensity	  of	  the	  nudge	  is	  important.	  	  
Despite	  all	  interventions	  reducing	  open	  defecation,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  most	  of	  the	  
interventions	  were,	  on	  average,	  strong	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  improve	  child	  health.	  Only	  the	  Mali	  
intervention	  is	  significantly	  associated	  with	  a	  0.17	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  height	  and	  the	  
Mali	   intervention	   had	   close	   to	   3-­‐times	   the	   effect	   on	   open	   defecation	   than	   the	   next	   most	  
effective	  intervention.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   assess	   the	  magnitudes	  of	   reductions	   in	  OD	  needed	   to	   achieve	  meaningful	  
improvements	   in	   child	   health,	   we	   pooled	   the	   data	   and	   estimated	   the	   relationship	   between	  
village-­‐level	  OD	  and	  child	  height	  using	  experimentally	  induced	  variation	  in	  the	  data	  to	  identify	  
the	  causal	  relationship.	   	  We	  estimated	  that	  completely	  eliminating	  OD	  from	  a	  village	  in	  which	  
everyone	  defecated	  in	  the	  open	  would	  result	  in	  a	  0.44	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  height.	  
	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  important	  conclusions	  from	  this	  analysis.	  First	  of	  all,	  reductions	  in	  
village-­‐level	  OD	  do	  indeed	  seem	  to	  lead	  to	  improved	  child	  height.	  Second,	  reductions	  in	  OD	  in	  
villages	  that	  have	  relatively	   low	  levels	  of	  OD	  are	  not	  only	  going	  to	  be	  hard	  to	  achieve	  but	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  have	  an	   impact	  on	  health.	   	  Third,	  the	  small	  to	  modest	  reductions	   in	  OD	  generated	  
from	   the	   interventions	   in	   India,	   Indonesia	   and	   Tanzania	   were	   not	   large	   enough	   to	   generate	  
meaningful	   improvements	   in	   health.	   	   Hence,	   the	   interventions	   need	   to	   be	   strengthened	   in	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order	   to	   reduce	  village	  OD	  enough	   to	  have	  meaningful	  effects	  on	  child	  health.	   	   The	  question	  
then	  is	  what	  types	  of	  interventions	  are	  strong	  enough.	  	  
	   The	   biggest	   reductions	   in	   village	   OD	   come	   from	   expanding	   sanitation	   coverage.	  
Therefore,	   targeting	   interventions	   to	   villages	   with	   low	   private	   sanitation	   coverage	   has	   the	  
greatest	  potential.	  However,	  the	  expansion	  of	  private	  sanitation	  is	  not	  enough	  by	  itself	  to	  have	  
a	  meaningful	   effect	   on	   height.	   Take-­‐up	   of	   private	   sanitation	   reduces	   household	  OD	   rates	   by	  
0.29	  in	  Mali,	  0.36	  in	  Tanzania,	  0.37	  in	  India,	  and	  0.61	  in	  Indonesia.	  This	  means	  that,	  except	   in	  
Indonesia,	   going	   from	   zero	   to	   100%	   sanitation	   coverage	   would	   still	   lead	   to	   a	   less	   than	   0.2	  
standard	  deviation	  improvement	  in	  height.	  However,	  except	  in	  India,	  most	  villages	  already	  have	  
substantial	   sanitation	   coverage	   implying	   that	   the	   potential	   gains	   from	   increases	   in	   sanitation	  
coverage	  are	  substantially	  lower.	  	  
	   Moreover,	   how	   one	   promotes	   sanitation	   expansion	   is	   important.	   It	   appears	   that	  
households	   that	   are	   encouraged	   through	   the	   health	   promotion	   into	   installing	   sanitation	  
facilities	  use	   them	   less	   than	  households	  who	  build	   them	  through	  subsidies.	   	  Hence,	   subsidies	  
appear	  to	  be	  a	  more	  effective	  method	  of	  promoting	  households	  to	  use	  private	  sanitation	  than	  
behavior	  change.	  
	   While	  expanding	  private	  sanitation	  facility	  installation	  is	  a	  critical	  step,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  
to	  achieve	  meaningful	  improvements	  in	  health	  outcomes.	  Our	  results	  do	  suggest	  however,	  that	  
combining	   subsidies	  with	   intensive	   CLTS	   or	   another	   behavioral	   change	   intervention	   could	   be	  
effective.	  The	  behavioral	  effects	  in	  Mali	  showed	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  the	  use	  of	  sanitation	  
among	   those	   who	   had	   sanitation	   facilities.	   	   Specifically,	   in	   Mali	   the	   intervention	   led	   to	   a	  
reduction	   in	  OD	  of	  21	  percentage	  points	  among	   those	   that	  had	  private	   sanitation	   facilities	  at	  
baseline.	   Combining	   this	   with	   a	   large	   expansion	   of	   sanitation	   facilities	   from	   subsidies	   could	  
generate	   sufficiently	   large	   reductions	   in	   village	   OD	   to	   achieve	   meaningful	   improvements	   in	  
health	   outcomes.	  Whether	   this	   approach	   is	   cost-­‐effective	   depends	   in	   large	   part	   on	   the	   price	  
elasticity	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  sanitation	  facilities.	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Table	  1:	  Experimental	  Design	  and	  Data	  
	   India	   Indonesia	   Mali	   Tanzania	  
Geographic	  Location	   2	  rural	  Districts	  in	  
Madhya	  Pradesh	  	  
8	  rural	  Districts	  in	  
East	  Java	  	  
Province	  of	  
	  Koulikoro	  
10	  rural	  Districts	  
all	  over	  country	  
Random	  Assignment	   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Unit	  of	  Assignment	   Village   Village   Village   Village  
Stratification	   Block   Subdistrict   None   District  
Treatment	  Group	  Compliance	   100%   66%   98%   84%  
Control	  Group	  Contamination	   25%   14%   10%   0%  
Average	  Exposure	  period	   6  months   24  months   18  months   23  months  
Date	  Baseline	  Survey	   May-­‐July  2009   Aug-­‐Sept  2008   April-­‐July  2011   None  
Date	  Endline	  Survey	   Feb-­‐April  2011   Nov  2010-­‐Jan  2011   April-­‐June  2013   May-­‐Dec  2012  
Number	  of	  Villages	   80   160   121   90  
Number	  of	  Households	   1,655   1,908   7,461   1,800  
Number	  of	  Children	  under	  5	   2046   2300   6745   N/A  
Treatment	  Attrition	  Rate	   7.9%   4.4%   6.1%   N/A  
Control	  Attrition	  Rate	   7.4%   4.1%   6.4%   N/A  
Sources:	  For	  India	  see	  Patil	  et	  al	  (2013	  and	  2014).	  For	  Indonesia	  see	  Cameron	  and	  Shah	  (2010)	  and	  Cameron,	  Shah	  
and	  Olivia	  (2013).	  For	  Mali	  see	  Aluza	  et	  al	  (2014).	  For	  Tanzania	  see	  Martinez	  et	  al	  (2014).	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Table	  2:	  Intervention	  Design	  by	  Country	  
Country	  
	  
#	  of	  CLTS	  Visits	  to	  Communities	  
Subsidy	  for	  
construction	  
Strengthen	  Supply	  of	  
Construction	  Materials	  
and	  Skilled	  Masons	  
India	  
  
One  CLTS  visit   Yes   No  
Indonesia	  
  
One  CLTS  visit  with  one  follow-­‐up  
visit  to  reinforce  messages  
No   No  
Mali	  
  
One  CLTS  visit  with  12  monthly  
follow-­‐up  visit  to  reinforce  messages  
No   No  
Tanzania	  
  
One  CLTS  visits  with  one  follow-­‐up  
visit  to  reinforce  messages  
No   No  
Sources:	  For	  India	  see	  Patil	  et	  al	  (2013	  and	  2014).	  For	  Indonesia	  see	  Cameron	  and	  Shah	  (2010)	  and	  Cameron,	  Shah	  
and	  Olivia	  (2013).	  For	  Mali	  see	  Aluza	  et	  al	  (2014).	  For	  Tanzania	  see	  Martinez	  et	  al	  (2014).	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Table	  3:	  Impact	  of	  Treatment	  on	  Open	  Defecation	  
	   	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   Full	  Sample	  
Households	  with	  
Private	  Sanitation	  at	  
Baseline	  
Households	  without	  
Private	  Sanitation	  at	  
Baseline	  
Indonesia	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	   	   -­‐0.030   0.005   -­‐0.077***  
	   	   [0.027]   [0.014]   [0.029]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,899   962   937  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.409   0.087   0.760  
India	   	           
Treatment	   	   -­‐0.090***   0.029   -­‐0.091***  
	   	   [0.031]   [0.042]   [0.020]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,655   202   1,453  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.859   0.177   0.947  
Mali	   	           
Treatment	   	   -­‐0.328***   -­‐0.211***   -­‐0.385***  
	  	   	   [0.036]   [0.023]   [0.041]  
Sample	  Size	   	   3,981   1,383   2,598  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.568   0.365   0.679  
Tanzania	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	   	   -­‐0.125***   0.007   -­‐0.135***  
	  	   	   [0.028]   [0.006]   [0.034]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,786   467   1,319  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.233   0.005   0.299  
Notes:	  This	   table	  reports	   the	  estimated	  effect	  of	   treatment	  on	  the	  household’s	  degree	  of	  open	  defecation.	  Each	  
panel	  represents	  a	  different	  sample	  and	  each	  column	  a	  different	  specification.	  Each	  treatment	  effect	  comes	  from	  a	  
separate	   linear	  regression.	  See	  tables	   in	   the	  appendix	   for	  baseline	  balance	  results.	   Indonesia	  regressions	   include	  
sub-­‐district	  fixed	  effects,	   India	  block	  fixed	  effects,	  and	  Tanzania	  district	  fixed	  effects.	   	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  
clustered	   at	   the	   village	   level	   in	   Indonesia,	   India,	   Mali	   and	   Tanzania;	   these	   are	   reported	   in	   brackets	   below	   the	  
treatment	  effects.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  4:	  Impact	  of	  Treatment	  on	  Access	  to	  Sanitation	  Facilities,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Among	  Households	  Without	  Private	  Sanitation	  Facilities	  at	  Baseline	  
	   	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   Any	  Sanitation	   Private	  Sanitation	   Shared	  Sanitation	  
Indonesia	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	   	   0.076***     0.043**   0.034*  
	   	   [0.023]   [0.017]   [0.018]  
Sample	  Size	   	       937     937   937  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.163   0.080   0.095  
India	   	           
Treatment	   	     0.238***   0.236***   0.003  
	   	   [0.037]     [0.034]     [0.006]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,453   1,453   1,453    
Control	  Mean	   	     0.141   0.133   0.008    
Mali	   	           
Treatment	   	   0.390***   0.381***   0.009**  
	   	   [0.029]   [0.029]   [0.004]  
Sample	  Size	   	   2,639   2,639   2,639  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.146   0.141   0.005  
Tanzania	   	           
Treatment	   	   0.134***   0.153***   -­‐0.019  
	  	   	   [0.034]   [0.029]   [0.027]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,323   1,323   1,323  
Control	  Mean	   	   0.702   0.372   0.330  
Notes:	  This	  table	  reports	  the	  estimated	  effect	  of	  treatment	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  household	  has	  access	  to	  any	  
sanitation	  facility,	  a	  private	  facility	  on	  their	  property,	  and	  a	  shared	  public	  or	  private	  facility	  not	  on	  their	  property.	  
Each	  panel	  represents	  a	  different	  sample	  and	  each	  column	  a	  different	  specification.	  Each	  treatment	  effect	  comes	  
from	  a	   separate	   linear	   regression.	  See	   tables	   in	   the	  appendix	   for	  baseline	  balance	   results.	   Indonesia	   regressions	  
include	   sub-­‐district	   fixed	   effects,	   India	   block	   fixed	   effects,	   and	   Tanzania	   district	   fixed	   effects.	   	   Robust	   standard	  
errors	   are	   clustered	   at	   the	   village	   level	   in	   Indonesia,	   India,	  Mali,	   and	   Tanzania;	   these	   are	   reported	   in	   brackets	  
below	  the	  treatment	  effects.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  5:	  Decomposition	  of	  Treatment	  Impacts	  on	  Open	  Defecation,	  
	  Households	  Without	  Private	  Sanitation	  at	  Baseline	  
	  
Treatment	  	  
λ! 	  
Private	  
Sanitation	  
λ! 	  	  
(Treatment)	  	  ×	  
(Private	  Sanitation)	  
λ! 	  
Sample	  
Size	  
Control	  
Mean	  
Panel	  A:	  No	  Controls              
Indonesia	   -­‐0.064**   -­‐0.613***   0.107   937   0.760  
	   [0.029]   [0.056]   [0.073]        
India	   -­‐0.004   -­‐0.372***   0.001   1,453   0.947  
	   [0.010]   [0.063]   [0.075]        
Mali	   -­‐0.361***   -­‐0.291***   0.148***   2,544   0.685  
	   [0.047]   [0.042]   [0.056]        
Tanzania	   -­‐0.108**   -­‐0.363***   0.056   1,319   0.299  
	   [0.047]   [0.039]   [0.054]        
Panel	  B:	  With	  Controls         	   	  
Indonesia	   -­‐0.059**   -­‐0.578***   0.109   937	   .760	  
	   [0.028]   [0.056]   [0.0737]   	   	  
India	   0.006   -­‐0.328***   -­‐0.034   1,453   0.947  
	   [0.012]   [0.060]   [0.072]   	   	  
Mali	   -­‐0.353***   -­‐0.276***   0.143***   2,377	   0.688	  
	   [0.043]   [0.042]   [0.054]   	   	  
Tanzania	   -­‐0.095**   -­‐0.368***   0.047   1,317	   0.298	  
	   [0.045]   [0.037]   [0.053]   	   	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   reports	   the	   estimated	   effects	   on	   the	   household’s	   degree	   of	   open	   defecation.	   Each	   panel	  
represents	   a	   different	   sample	   and	   each	   column	   a	   different	   specification.	   Each	   treatment	   effect	   comes	   from	   a	  
separate	   linear	   regression.	   The	   set	   of	   controls	   in	   the	   Indonesia	  models	   in	   Panel	   B	   include	   the	   age,	   gender	   and	  
education	   of	   the	   household	   head,	   household	   size,	   the	   natural	   log	   of	   household	   per	   capita	   income	   at	   baseline,	  
whether	  the	  household	  had	  a	  dirt	  floor	  at	  baseline,	  whether	  the	  village	  is	  within	  a	  ten-­‐minute	  walk	  from	  a	  river,	  
risk	  tolerance,	  a	  discount	  rate,	  and	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  randomization	  block.	  The	  controls	  for	   India	   in	  Panel	  B	  are	  
baseline	  indicators	  of	  whether	  any	  caregiver	  in	  the	  household	  had	  correct	  knowledge	  about	  diarrhea,	  whether	  any	  
caregiver	  in	  the	  household	  had	  correct	  knowledge	  about	  risks	  of	  open	  defecation,	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  household	  head,	  
dummies	   for	   primary-­‐secondary-­‐higher	   secondary+	   education	   levels	   of	   the	   household	   head,	   whether	   the	  
household	  belonged	  to	  a	  marginalized	  caste	   (SCST),	  whether	  household	   is	  below	  poverty	   line	  as	  per	   their	   ration	  
card	   (official	   document),	   number	   of	   members	   in	   the	   household,	   wealth	   index,	   and	   natural	   log	   of	   monthly	  
household	  income.	  The	  set	  of	  controls	  for	  Mali	  in	  Panel	  B	  are	  age,	  gender,	  literacy	  of	  the	  household	  head,	  reported	  
household	  size	  at	  baseline,	  language	  spoken	  in	  the	  household	  (dummy=1	  if	  Bambara	  is	  the	  main	  language),	  asset	  
index,	  OD	  disapproval	  and	  an	  index	  of	  social	  capital.	  The	  set	  of	  controls	  for	  Tanzania	  in	  Panel	  B	  are	  household	  head	  
sex,	  age,	  and	  years	  of	  education,	  household	  size,	  household	  wealth,	  material	  for	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  main	  living	  area	  is	  
made	  of	  earth	  or	   clay,	   and	  whether	   the	   respondent	  knows	  OD	  causes	  animals	   to	  become	  sick.	  Robust	   standard	  
errors	  are	  clustered	  at	   the	  village	   level	   in	   Indonesia,	   India,	  Mali,	  and	  Tanzania;	   these	  are	  reported	   in	   in	  brackets	  
below	  the	  treatment	  effects.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  6:	  Decomposition	  of	  Treatment	  on	  OD	  Into	  Behavioral	  and	  Investment	  Pathways	  
   Behavioral	  Change	  (OD)	  
	  
Investment	  Effect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Private	  In-­‐home	  Sanitation	  
Construction)	  
	  
Total	  
Change	  
  
Households	  With	  Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In-­‐home	  Sanitation	  
Households	  Without	  Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In-­‐home	  Sanitation	  
	  
Households	  Without	  Private	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In-­‐home	  Sanitation	  
	  
All	  
   𝑑𝜋 𝐷 𝑆 = 1 𝜋 𝑆 	   %	  of	  Total	  Δ	  
𝑑𝜋 𝐷 𝑆 = 0 	  ×
             1 − 𝜋 𝑆 	  
%	  of	  
Total	  Δ	  
	  
𝑑𝜋 𝑆 𝜋 𝐷 𝑆 = 1
− 𝜋 𝐷 𝑆 = 0 	  
%	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Total	  Δ	  
	  
=  𝑑𝜋 𝐷 	  
Indonesia	   Not  Significant     (0.0%)   -­‐0.064  ×  0.877  =  -­‐0.056     (71.8%)  
  
0.043  ×  -­‐0.506  =  -­‐0.022     (28.2%)  
  
-­‐  0.078  
India	   Not  Significant     (0.0%)   Not  Significant     (0.0%)  
  
0.236  ×  -­‐0.371  =  -­‐0.088     (100%)  
  
-­‐  0.088  
Mali	   -­‐0.211  ×  0.522  =  -­‐0.110     (32.6%)   -­‐0.361  ×  0.478  =  -­‐0.173     (51.3%)  
  
0.381  ×  -­‐0.143  =  -­‐0.054     (16.1%)  
  
-­‐  0.337  
Tanzania	   Not  Significant     (0.0%)   -­‐0.108  ×  0.475  =  -­‐0.051     (52%)  
  
0.153  ×  -­‐0.307  =  -­‐0.047     (48%)  
  
-­‐  0.098  
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Table	  7.	  Effect	  of	  Village	  Open	  Defecation	  on	  Child	  Height	  for	  Age	  z-­‐scores	  
	   	   (1)	   (2)	   	   (3)	   (4)	  
	   	   OLS	   	   IV	  GMM	  
	   	  
	  No	  
Controls	   	  Controls	   	  
	  No	  
Controls	   	  Controls	  
Panel  A:  Child  Height  z-­‐score              
Village	  Open	  Defecation	   	   -­‐0.420***	   -­‐0.341***   	   -­‐0.460***   -­‐0.344**	  
	  	   	   [0.116]	   [0.120]   	   [0.159]   [0.159]	  
Sample	  Size	  (individuals)	   	   5,600   5,600   	   5,600   5,600	  
Sample	  Size	  (villages)	   	   318	   318	   	   318	   318	  
Control	  Mean	   	   -­‐1.813   -­‐1.813   	   -­‐1.813   -­‐1.813	  
Panel	  B:	  First	  Stage	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Treatment	  India	   	   	   	   	   0.221***	   0.214***	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.038]	   [0.037]	  
Treatment	  Indonesia	   	   	   	   	   0.011	   -­‐0.001	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.030]	   [0.027]	  
Treatment	  Mali	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.254***	  
-­‐
0.247***	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.064]	   [0.056]	  
Treat	  x	  (Share	  HHs	  w/	  San	  in	  Vil	  at	  BL)	  x	  India	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.497***	   -­‐.489***	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.059]	   [0.059]	  
Treat	  x	  (Share	  w/	  San	  in	  Vil	  at	  BL)	  x	  Indonesia	  
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0.914***	  
-­‐
0.858***	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.131]	   [0.122]	  
Treat	  x	  (Share	  HHs	  w/	  San	  in	  Vil	  at	  BL)	  x	  Mali	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.207*	   -­‐0.184*	  
	   	   	   	   	   [0.119]	   [0.108]	  
Kleibergen-­‐Paap	  Wald	  F-­‐Statistic	   	   	   	   	   6210.1	   2913.7	  
Notes:	   This	   table	   reports	   the	   estimated	  effect	   of	   village	  OD	  on	   child	   height	   for	   age	   z-­‐scores.	  All	   regressions	   are	  
estimated	  using	  pooled	  samples	  of	  children	  under	  5	  at	  baseline	  for	  India,	  Indonesia,	  and	  Mali.	  Columns	  1-­‐2	  report	  
results	  from	  OLS	  regressions	  and	  columns	  3-­‐4	  report	  results	  from	  GMM	  IV	  regressions.	  There	  are	  six	  instruments	  
for	  village	  OD:	  treatment	  in	  each	  country	  (3)	  and	  sanitation	  coverage	  at	  baseline	  at	  the	  village	  level	  interacted	  with	  
treatment	  (3).	  Columns	  1	  and	  3	  only	  include	  controls	  for	  baseline	  height	  of	  the	  child,	  country	  and	  an	  indicator	  of	  
the	  randomization	  block.	  Columns	  2	  and	  4	  further	  include	  a	  separate	  set	  of	  controls	  all	  measured	  at	  baseline	  for	  
each	   country	   interacted	   with	   a	   country	   dummy.	   The	   Indonesia	   controls	   include	   child	   age	   and	   sex	   dummies,	  
education	  of	  the	  household	  head,	  household	  size,	  household	  per	  capita	  income,	  dirt	  floor,	  village	  is	  within	  a	  ten-­‐
minute	   walk	   from	   a	   river,	   and	   discount	   rate.	   The	   India	   controls	   for	   controls	   include	   age	   and	   sex	   dummies,	  
improved	   water	   source,	   hand	   washing	   station	   with	   soap	   and	   water,	   caregiver	   had	   correct	   knowledge	   about	  
diarrhea,	   caregiver	   had	   correct	   knowledge	   about	   risks	   of	   open	   defecation,	   age	   and	   sex	   of	   household	   head,	  
household	   size,	   and	   household	   income.	   The	   Mali	   controls	   include	   child	   age	   and	   sex	   dummies,	   education	   and	  
language	   spoken	  by	   the	  household	  head,	  OD	  disapproval,	   asset	   index,	   and	   social	   capital	   index.	  Robust	   standard	  
errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  village	  level	  and	  are	  reported	  in	  brackets	  below	  the	  main	  effects.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  
*	  p<0.1.	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Table	  8.	  Impact	  of	  Treatment	  on	  Child	  Height	  for	  Age	  Z-­‐score	  
	   	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
	   	   Indonesia	   India	   Mali	  
Treatment	   	   -­‐0.0118   0.025   0.174**  
	  	   	   [0.0405]   [0.104]   [0.076]  
Sample	  Size	   	   1,919   1,286   2,182  
Control	  Mean	   	   -­‐1.725   -­‐1.782   -­‐1.725  
Notes:	  This	  table	  reports	  the	  estimated	  effect	  of	  treatment	  on	  the	  height	  for	  age	  z-­‐scores.	  Each	  treatment	  effect	  
comes	  from	  a	  separate	   linear	  regression.	  All	  models	   include	  controls	   for	  baseline	  z-­‐score,	  age	  and	  sex	  dummies,	  
and	  randomization	  strata	  fixed	  effects.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  village	  level	  and	  are	  reported	  in	  
brackets	  below	  the	  treatment	  effects.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Figure	  2:	  Distributions	  of	  Village	  Open	  Defecation	  Rates	  at	  Endline	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Figure	  3:	  Nonparametric	  Regression	  of	  Child	  Height	  for	  Age	  z-­‐scores	  on	  Village	  OD	  Rate	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Appendix:  Experimental  Design  and  Data     
Sample	  Selection	  and	  Randomization	  	  
The	  data	  used	   in	  this	  paper	  were	  generated	  from	  cluster-­‐randomized	   interventions	   in	  all	   four	  
countries.	   	   The	   unit	   of	   randomization	  was	   the	   village	   in	   all	   four	   countries.	   In	   3	   out	   of	   the	   4	  
countries,	   the	   villages	  were	   first	   clustered	   into	   strata	   and	   then	   the	   villages	  were	   randomized	  
into	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  within	  each	  stratum.	  	  The	  data	  used	  are	  from	  baseline	  and	  
follow-­‐up	  surveys	  of	  households	  with	  children	  under	  2	  years	  of	  age.	  In	  general,	  the	  samples	  for	  
all	  four	  countries	  appear	  to	  be	  well	  balanced	  at	  baseline,	  have	  low	  levels	  of	  attrition,	  and	  show	  
little	  evidence	  of	  attrition	  bias.	  The	  details	  of	   the	  random	  assignment	  and	  data	  collection	  are	  
presented	  in	  Table	  1	  and	  discussed	  in	  the	  data	  appendix.	  	  
	  
The	  evaluation	  occurred	  in	  eight	  districts	  of	  rural	  East	  Java,	  Indonesia;	  in	  2	  districts	  in	  Madhya	  
Pradesh,	  India;	  the	  region	  of	  Koulikoro	  in	  Mali,	  and	  10	  districts	  in	  Tanzania.	  The	  strata	  used	  for	  
random	   assignment	   are	   sub-­‐districts	   in	   Indonesia,	   blocks	   in	   India,	   and	   districts	   in	   Tanzania.	  	  
There	   were	   no	   stratifications	   used	   in	   Mali.	   Detailed	   information	   on	   sample	   selection	   and	  
randomization	   can	   be	   found	   for	   each	   country	   in	   Cameron	   and	   Shah	   (2010),	   Cameron	   et	   al.	  
(2013),	  Patil	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  Alzua	  et	  al.	  (2014),	  and	  Briceño	  et	  al.	  (2014). 
	  
In	   Indonesia,	  during	   the	   study	  period,	   trained	   facilitators	  went	   into	   the	  eight	  project	  districts	  
and	   supported	   the	   local	   governments	   in	   conducting	   triggering	   and	   follow-­‐up	   activities	   in	   the	  
communities.	  Of	  the	  80	  treatment	  villages,	  the	  endline	  survey	  data	  shows	  that	  53	  villages	  (66	  
percent)	  were	   triggered.4	  Approximately	  14%	  of	  control	  villages	  were	   triggered.	   Initial	   sample	  
size	  calculations	  indicate	  that	  this	  level	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  underpower	  our	  
results.	  	  
	  
In	  India,	  two	  districts	  in	  Madhya	  Pradesh	  participated	  in	  the	  impact	  evaluation	  of	  TSC	  (Dhar	  and	  
Khargone),	   for	   a	   total	   of	   80	   rural	   villages.	   One	   hundred	   percent	   of	   the	   treatment	   villages	  
received	   the	  program.	   	  Based	  on	   interviews	  with	  block	   level	   Total	   Sanitation	  Campaign	   (TSC)	  
officers,	  all	  treatment	  GPs	  received	  at	  least	  some	  funds	  with	  more	  than	  half	  receiving	  100%	  of	  
the	   allocated	   budget	   for	   TSC.	   Block	   officers	   also	   reported	   that	   10	   of	   the	   40	   control	   villages	  
(~25%)	  received	  the	  TSC	  program.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  case	  of	  Mali,	  100%	  of	  the	  treatment	  communities	  received	  the	  program	  and	  59	  out	  of	  
60	  communities	  achieved	  Open	  Defecation	  Free	  Certification.	  While	  10	  percent	  of	  the	  control	  
communities	   reported	   to	   have	   received	   some	  program	   for	   constructing	   latrines,	   they	   do	   not	  
mention	   Unicef	   or	   the	   Malian	   Government.	   The	   team	   was	   not	   aware	   of	   any	   other	   NGOs	  
promoting	   sanitation	   in	   the	   region	   of	   the	   study	   at	   that	   time,	   but	   some	   local	   churches	   and	  
advocacy	  groups	  may	  be	  present	  to	  promote	  improved	  sanitation.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4This means that one or more of the four community leaders surveyed (village head, community head, health cadre, 
head of women’s organization, or other community leader) reported that the village had received a triggering. 
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Tanzania	  is	  administratively	  separated	  into	  30	  Regions,	  169	  Districts	  and	  3643	  Wards,	  with	  the	  
average	  ward	  holding	  approximately	  12,000	  people.	   	  The	  sample	  was	  drawn	  from	  10	  districts	  
spread	  throughout	  the	  country	  selected	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Water	  (MoW)	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  
and	  Social	  Welfare	  (MoHSW)	  to	  provide	  geographic	  diversity	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  To	  evaluate	  
the	  impact	  of	  TSSM,	  a	  cluster-­‐randomized	  evaluation	  with	  random	  assignment	  of	  interventions	  
at	  the	  ward	  level	  was	  implemented	  (including	  44	  treatment	  and	  46	  control	  wards).	  Wards	  were	  
identified	  as	   the	  optimal	  operational	  unit	  of	   implementation	   for	   the	  project,	  and	  of	  sufficient	  
geographic	   extension	   to	   minimize	   the	   risk	   of	   significant	   information	   spillovers	   between	  
populations	  exposed	   to	   the	   localized	  messages,	   community	  events,	  and	  other	   forms	  of	   social	  
promotion	   activities.	   	   Program	   reports	   suggest	   that	   86%	  of	  wards	  were	   triggered	  with	   TSSM	  
activities	  and	  that	  there	  was	  no	  contamination	  into	  control	  areas.	  	  
Data	  Collection	  	  
The	  data	  collection	  efforts	  focused	  on	  households	  with	  children	  under	  2	  years	  of	  age	  as	  young	  
children’s	  health	  is	  affected	  the	  most	  by	  poor	  sanitation	  (Murray	  and	  Lopez,	  1997).	  All	  countries	  
used	  similar	  and	  standardized	  structured	  questionnaires,	  but	  questionnaires	  were	  also	  modified	  
to	   suit	   the	   local	   research	   needs.	   The	   survey	   collected	   data	   on	   social	   and	   demographic	  
characteristics	   of	   the	   household	   and	   its	  members,	   information	   on	   household	   income,	   assets	  
and	   labor	   force	   activity,	   household	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   for	   sanitation,	   hygiene	   and	  
water,	  major	  housing	  facilities	  and	  amenities,	  and	  child	  school	  attendance	  and	  care.	  The	  survey	  
also	   elicited	   the	   sanitation	   and	   hygiene	   knowledge,	   attitudes,	   and	   practices	   of	   the	   main	  
caregivers	   of	   children	   under	   5	   years.	   The	   health	   survey	   recorded	   recent	   illness	   for	   children	  
under	  5	  years	  and	  anthropometric	  measurements.	  	  
	  
In	  Indonesia,	  the	  baseline	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  both	  treatment	  and	  control	  communities	  in	  
August	  –	  September	  2008.	  A	  total	  of	  2,087	  households	  with	  2,353	  children	  under	  5	  years	  in	  160	  
sub-­‐villages	  were	  interviewed.	  The	  sample	  frame	  of	  households	  with	  at	  least	  one	  child	  under	  2	  
years	   was	   determined	   by	   lists	   provided	   by	   the	   community	   health	   cadre	   in	   each	   sub-­‐village.	  	  
Thirteen	  households	  were	  then	  randomly	  selected	  from	  this	  listing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  baseline	  
survey.	  The	  follow-­‐up	  data	  collection	  was	  conducted	  approximately	  24	  months	  later,	  between	  
November	  2010	  and	  February	  2011.	   The	  endline	   survey	  used	   the	   same	   field	  methodology	  as	  
the	  baseline	  survey.	  The	  final	  sample	  size	  in	  the	  endline	  survey	  included	  1,908	  households	  from	  
the	   baseline	   survey	   with	   no	   significant	   differential	   attrition	   between	   treatment	   and	   control	  
groups.	  
	  
In	   India,	   the	   baseline	   survey	   was	   conducted	   in	   May-­‐July	   2009.	   	   From	   the	   80	   villages	   we	  
completed	  surveys	  of	  1954	  households.	  	  The	  survey	  firm	  listed	  and	  mapped	  households	  in	  each	  
village	  with	   information	   on	  whether	   they	   had	   a	   child	   under	   2	   years.	   From	   the	   list	   of	   eligible	  
households,	  25	  households	  were	  randomly	  selected	  by	  the	  supervisor	  of	  the	  survey	  team	  using	  
systematic	  random	  sampling.	  	  The	  follow	  up	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  February-­‐April	  2011	  –	  21	  
months	   after	   the	   baseline	   survey.	   The	   final	   sample	   size	   in	   the	   endline	   survey	   included	   1655	  
households	   from	  the	  baseline	  survey	  with	  2046	  children,	  again	  with	  no	  significant	  differential	  
attrition	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups.	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For	   Mali,	   baseline	   information	   was	   collected	   between	   April	   and	   July	   2011.	   A	   census	   was	  
conducted	   in	   all	   121	   communities	   and	   all	   households	   with	   children	   under	   10	   where	  
interviewed.	   	  A	   total	  of	  4532	  households	  were	   interviewed	  at	  baseline.	  The	   follow	  up	   survey	  
took	  place	  between	  April	  and	  June	  2013	  and	  a	  total	  of	  4031	  households	  could	  be	  matched	  to	  
the	   ones	   present	   in	   the	   baseline.	   Finally,	   children	   with	   complete	   anthropometric	   measures	  
matched	  at	  baseline	  and	  follow	  up	  total	  approximately	  2619.	  	  	  	  
	  
Tanzania	  lacks	  a	  baseline	  survey	  and	  only	  had	  endline	  data.	  Although	  a	  baseline	  data	  collection	  
was	  intended,	  unanticipated	  problems	  with	  reliability	  of	  data	  resulted	  in	  the	  cancelation	  of	  field	  
work	  in	  five	  out	  of	  the	  10	  districts	  originally	  planned	  and	  the	  impossibility	  of	  using	  the	  data	  to	  
validate	  the	  randomized	  design,	  as	   it	  was	  originally	  planned.	  However,	  an	  endline	  survey	  was	  
conducted	  in	  2012.	  Sample	  size	  details	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  
Tests	  of	  Balance	  and	  Attrition	  
Randomization	   aims	   to	   minimize	   systematic	   differences	   between	   the	   control	   and	   treatment	  
groups.	  However,	  the	  extent	  of	  sample	  attrition	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  attrition	  is	  nonrandom	  
is	  a	  legitimate	  concern	  in	  any	  follow-­‐up	  survey.	  	  In	  India,	  of	  the	  1,954	  households	  surveyed	  at	  
the	  baseline,	  299	  were	   lost	   and	  1,655	  were	   surveyed	   in	   the	   follow-­‐up	   survey	   (15%	  attrition).	  
The	  sample	  loss	  was	  not	  differential	  by	  the	  treatment	  (154)	  and	  control	  (145)	  groups.	  Patil	  et	  al.	  
(2013)	   show	   that	   the	   attrition	  was	   also	   not	   differential	   by	   the	   treatment	   and	   control	   groups	  
based	   on	   several	   important	   characteristics	   and	   that	   the	   baseline	   samples	   are	   well	   balanced	  
between	   treatment	   and	   control	   villages.	   	   The	   few	   variables	   that	   were	   not	   balanced	   at	   the	  
baseline	  are	  adjusted	  for	  in	  our	  analysis.	  	  
	  
In	  Indonesia,	  of	  2,087	  households	  interviewed	  at	  the	  baseline	  8.5	  percent	  households	  were	  lost	  
and	  1,908	  households	  were	  successfully	  re-­‐interviewed	  at	  the	  follow	  up	  survey.	   	  The	  loss	  was	  
similar	  in	  treatment	  and	  control	  villages;	  86	  households	  in	  the	  control	  and	  93	  households	  in	  the	  
treatment	  group.	  Cameron	  and	  Shah	  (2010)	  show	  that	  baseline	  sample	  was	  well	  balanced	  and	  
Cameron	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  report	  that	  attrition	  did	  not	  result	   in	  significant	   imbalance	  in	   important	  
household	  characteristics	  between	  treatment	  and	  control	  villages.	  	  The	  few	  variables	  that	  were	  
imbalanced	  at	  the	  baseline	  are	  adjusted	  for	  in	  our	  analysis	  
	  
For	  Mali,	  4532	  households	  were	  present	  at	  baseline	  and	  12.5%	  were	  either	  lost	  or	  could	  not	  be	  
matched	  to	  the	  ones	  in	  the	  baseline.	  In	  the	  follow	  up,	  5206	  households	  were	  interviewed,	  4031	  
were	  matched	  to	  baseline	  ones.	  The	  loss	  does	  not	  differ	  between	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  
and	  that	  attrition	  did	  not	  produced	  imbalance.	  (Alzua	  et	  al	  2014).	  
	  
Tests	  of	  balance	  and	  attrition	  for	  Tanzania	  are	  challenging	  since	  there	  was	  no	  baseline	  survey.	  
However,	   we	   show	   balance	   for	   a	   combination	   of	   time-­‐invariant	   indicators	   and	   retrospective	  
responses	  asked	   in	   the	  endline	  dating	   to	  February	  2009,	  before	   the	   intervention	  had	  started.	  
Table	  A4	   suggests	   fairly	   good	  balance.	  Differential	   attrition	  due	   to	  migration	  or	   other	   causes	  
could	   also	   be	   a	   concern.	   However,	   data	   from	   the	   complete	   census	   listings	   of	   selected	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enumerator	   areas	   provide	   evidence	   of	   limited	   migration	   and	   attrition.	   Less	   than	   5%	   of	  
households	  moved	  into	  the	  community	  within	  the	  three	  year	  intervention	  period,	  and	  this	  does	  
not	  differ	  across	   treatment/control	  groups.	  We	  mitigate	  any	  confounding	   that	  migration	  may	  
cause	  by	  restricting	  the	  sample	  to	  households	  residing	  in	  the	  area	  since	  2009.	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Table	  A1:	  INDONESIA	  BALANCE	  TABLE	  
Variables	  
With	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   No	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   All	  Households	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	   	  	   Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	   	  	   Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	  
Height-­‐for-­‐Age	  Z-­‐score	  for	  children	  under	  5	   -­‐1.704   -­‐1.691   0.  529      -­‐1.993   -­‐1.865   0.458      -­‐1.849   -­‐1.718   0.294  
Weigh	  for	  children	  under	  5	   8.28   8.22   0.595      8.15   8.25   0.365      8.21   8.23   0.817  
Household	  has	  private	  sanitation	  facility	   0.858   0.815   0.071      0   0   -­‐      0.421   0.425   0.857  
Household	  knows	  causes	  of	  diarrhea	   0.159   0.135   0.287      0.091   0.079   0.506      0.124   0.110   0.265  
Household	  has	  good	  OD	  knowledge	   0.648   0.630   0.567        0.452   0.  453   0.988        0.540   0.555   0.511  
Household	  size	   5.030   5.0181   0.898      4.820   4.626   0.035      4.923   4.831   0.162  
Age	  of	  	  household	  head	   41.39   41.80   0.567        39.69   38.974   0.304        40.53   40.45   0.875  
Male	  household	  head	   0.933   0.946   0.422        0.956   0.976   0.139        0.946   0.960   0.151  
Child	  is	  male	   0.478   0.515   0.239      0.517   0.507   0.755      0.490   0.497   0.728  
Household	  head	  completed	  primary	   0.426   0.376   0.117        0.602   0.598   0.904        0.515   0.482   0.149  
Household	  head	  completed	  secondary	   0.206   0.233   0.  314        0.193   0.189   0.878        0.200   0.212   0.497  
Household	  head	  completed	  higher-­‐secondary	  	   0.316   0.348   0.  294        0.137   0.138   0.946        0.225   0.248   0.239  
Log	  per	  capita	  income	   14.70   14.70   0.973        14.15   14.15   0.939        14.42   14.44   0.724  
Household	  is	  poor	   0.146   0.123   0.269      0.348   0.367   0.554      0.251   0.239   0.574  
Household	  has	  dirt	  floor	  	   0.146   0.185   0.106        0.320   0.343   0.448        0.234   0.261   0.188  
River	  runs	  through	  village	   0.690   0.640   0.098        0.782   0.796   0.615        0.737   0.714   0.266  
Risk	  tolerant	   0.185   0.150   0.045        0.160   0.169   0.644        0.172   0.156   0.244  
Discount	  rate	   0.601   0.584   0.282      0.609   0.601   0.652      0.604   0.592   0.321  
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Table	  A2:	  INDIA	  BALANCE	  TABLES	  
Variables	  
With	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   No	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   All	  Households	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	   	  	   Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	   	  	   Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	  
Child	  had	  diarrhea	  in	  last	  7	  days	   0.097	   0.063	   0.238	   	  	   0.140	   0.129	   0.608	   	  	   0.132	   0.121	   0.582	  
Mean	  Height-­‐for-­‐Age	  Z-­‐score	  for	  under	  5	  children	   -­‐1.312	   -­‐1.736	   0.117	   	  	   -­‐1.457	   -­‐1.854	   0.057	   	  	   -­‐1.391	   -­‐1.803	   0.056	  
Household	  reports	  OD	  as	  main	  sanitation	  option	   0.238	   0.174	   0.280	   	  	   0.900	   0.865	   0.510	   	  	   0.816	   0.790	   0.641	  
Household	  reports	  having	  improved	  sanitation	   0.731	   0.798	   0.276	   	  	   0.043	   0.029	   0.327	   	  	   0.136	   0.123	   0.685	  
%	  of	  HHs	  in	  GP	  with	  improved	  Sanitation	  facility	   0.253	   0.289	   0.513	   	  	   0.117	   0.097	   0.459	   	  	   0.136	   0.123	   0.688	  
%	  of	  HHs	  in	  GP	  with	  improved	  water	  source	   0.921	   0.865	   0.156	   	  	   0.887	   0.773	   0.027	   	  	   0.892	   0.797	   0.037	  
%	  of	  HHs	  in	  GP	  wi	  soap/water	  at	  hand-­‐washing	  station	   0.570	   0.692	   0.049	   	  	   0.429	   0.531	   0.118	   	  	   0.444	   0.540	   0.126	  
Age	  in	  months	  of	  the	  child	  under	  5	  years	   22.03	   22.219	   0.874	   	  	   21.71	   22.104	   0.461	   	  	   21.88	   22.120	   0.603	  
Age	  of	  household	  Head	   51.24	   52.716	   0.487	   	  	   45.18	   41.889	   0.006	   	  	   45.33	   43.179	   0.054	  
Male	  household	  head	   0.938	   0.954	   0.580	   	  	   0.937	   0.958	   0.077	   	  	   0.940	   0.948	   0.508	  
Household	  head	  attended	  school	   0.811	   0.829	   0.739	   	  	   0.461	   0.509	   0.301	   	  	   0.499	   0.527	   0.537	  
Household	  head	  completed	  primary	  school	   0.095	   0.133	   0.305	   	  	   0.117	   0.123	   0.756	   	  	   0.108	   0.124	   0.378	  
Household	  head	  completed	  secondary	  school	   0.619	   0.562	   0.295	   	  	   0.304	   0.339	   0.410	   	  	   0.341	   0.347	   0.883	  
Household	  Head	  completed	  higher-­‐secondary	  school	   0.087	   0.133	   0.318	   	  	   0.036	   0.043	   0.547	   	  	   0.045	   0.052	   0.549	  
Primary	  care	  giver	  knows	  the	  causes	  of	  diarrhea	   0.705	   0.697	   0.910	   	  	   0.667	   0.640	   0.418	   	  	   0.680	   0.659	   0.455	  
Household	  belongs	  to	  schedule	  caste/tribe	  	   0.333	   0.284	   0.563	   	  	   0.729	   0.769	   0.466	   	  	   0.697	   0.714	   0.762	  
House	  construction	  is	  robust	  (pucca)	   0.823	   0.899	   0.068	   	  	   0.543	   0.562	   0.721	   	  	   0.571	   0.604	   0.489	  
Log	  monthly	  household	  income	   4.150	   4.179	   0.651	   	  	   3.878	   3.877	   0.991	   	  	   3.843	   3.862	   0.506	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Table	  A3:	  MALI	  BALANCE	  TABLE	  
Variables	  
With	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   No	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   All	  Households	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	  
	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	  
	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	  
p-­‐value	  
Mean	  Height-­‐for-­‐Age	  Z-­‐score	  for	  under	  5	  children	   -­‐1.206	   -­‐1.175	   0.609	   	   -­‐1.391	   -­‐1.460	   0.382	   	   -­‐1.265	   -­‐1.267	   0.975	  
Mean	  Weight-­‐for-­‐Age	  Z-­‐score	  for	  under	  5	  children	   -­‐1.130	   -­‐1.102	   0.712	   	   -­‐1.290	   -­‐1.346	   0.515	   	   -­‐1.181	   -­‐1.180	   0.991	  
Age	  in	  months	  of	  the	  child	  under	  5	  years	   26.861	   27.184	   0.425	   	   26.554	   26.276	   0.578	   	   26.763	   26.891	   0.711	  
Household	  reports	  OD	  as	  sanitation	  option	   0.895	   0.884	   0.572	   	   0.995	   0.978	   0.040**	   	   0.930	   0.917	   0.375	  
Household	  reports	  OD	  as	  main	  sanitation	  option	   0.882	   0.852	   0.183	   	   0.982	   0.969	   0.310	   	   0.916	   0.893	   0.177	  
Household	  knows	  dirty	  place	  causes	  diarrhea	   0.795	   0.718	   0.002***	   	   0.721	   0.734	   0.788	   	   0.769	   0.724	   0.075*	  
Believes	  OD	  is	  Not	  Acceptable	   0.780	   0.789	   0.705	   	   0.618	   0.709	   0.097*	   	   0.724	   0.761	   0.188	  
OD	  is	  Not	  Acceptable	  in	  Community	   0.431	   0.548	   0.017**	   	   0.875	   0.889	   0.690	   	   0.585	   0.666	   0.138	  
Household	  size	  (self-­‐reported)	   7.997	   8.109	   0.708	   	   6.776	   6.877	   0.692	   	   7.564	   7.677	   0.656	  
Household	  is	  poor	  (lowest	  p(25))	   0.155	   0.187	   0.184	   	   0.442	   0.433	   0.897	   	   0.279	   0.305	   0.503	  
Household	  is	  poor	  (if	  sum	  of	  assets	  <	  30%	  )	   0.038	   0.051	   0.333	   	   0.167	   0.193	   0.609	   	   0.097	   0.114	   0.481	  
Household	  is	  poor	  (if	  sum	  of	  assets	  <	  35%	  )	   0.101	   0.130	   0.180	   	   0.359	   0.345	   0.835	   	   0.212	   0.229	   0.630	  
Household	  is	  poor	  (if	  sum	  of	  assets	  <	  40%	  )	   0.155	   0.187	   0.184	   	   0.442	   0.433	   0.897	   	   0.279	   0.305	   0.496	  
Literacy	  (household	  head)	   0.356	   0.365	   0.792	   	   0.212	   0.221	   0.823	   	   0.306	   0.314	   0.799	  
Male	  household	  head	   0.969	   0.973	   0.568	   	   0.963	   0.954	   0.518	   	   0.967	   0.966	   0.926	  
Age	  of	  	  household	  head	   44.264	   44.350	   0.912	   	   42.694	   43.015	   0.730	   	   43.703	   43.880	   0.792	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Table	  A4:	  TANZANIA	  BALANCE	  TABLE	  (ENDLINE	  DATA	  WITH	  RETROSPECTIVE	  VARIABLES)	  
Variables	  
	  
With	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   No	  Sanitation	  at	  BL	   	  	   All	  Households	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
	  Mean	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Control)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  p-­‐value	   	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	   p-­‐value	   	  
Mean	  
(Treat)	  
Mean	  
(Control)	   p-­‐value	  
A	  household	  member	  owns	  the	  dwelling	   	  0.912	   	  	  0.927	  	   0.448	   0.936	  	   0.920	  	   0.277	   0.899	  	   0.910	  	   0.505	  
Clean	  lighting	  energy	  (electricity,	  solar,	  gas)	   	   	  0.049	  	   	  	  0.065	  	   0.491	   0.029	  	   0.029	  	   0.963	   0.050	  	   0.053	  	   0.829	  
Electricity	  as	  main	  lighting	  energy	  source	   	  	  	  0.019	  	   0.040	  	   0.318	   0.015	  	   0.010	  	   0.494	   0.027	  	   0.029	  	   0.865	  
Paraffin	  lamps	  main	  lighting	  source	   	  	  	  0.799	  	   0.759	  	   0.360	   0.764	  	   0.685	  	   0.046**	   0.781	  	   0.695	  	   0.016**	  
Floor	  of	  main	  living	  area	  made	  of	  cement	   0.193	  	   0.213	  	   0.554	   0.097	  	   0.096	  	   0.93	   0.149	  	   0.148	  	   0.964	  
Floor	  of	  main	  living	  area	  made	  of	  earth/clay	   0.800	  	   0.765	  	   0.318	   0.896	  	   0.872	  	   0.26	   0.843	  	   0.825	  	   0.487	  
Male	   0.886	  	   0.829	  	   0.028**	   0.900	  	   0.890	  	   0.435	   0.883	  	   0.866	  	   0.125	  
Age	   41.392	  	   41.034	  	   0.691	   39.520	  	   39.618	  	   0.866	   40.123	  	   39.960	  	   0.730	  
Ever	  attended	  school	   0.816	  	   0.808	  	   0.758	   0.772	  	   0.719	  	   0.078*	   0.793	  	   0.757	  	   0.085*	  
Can	  read	  and	  write	   0.796	  	   0.759	  	   0.269	   0.717	  	   0.671	  	   0.13	   0.752	  	   0.709	  	   0.058*	  
Years	  of	  Education	  (if	  attended	  school)	   5.254	  	   5.172	  	   0.711	   4.927	  	   4.598	  	   0.119	   5.099	  	   4.903	  	   0.209	  
Muslim	   0.352	  	   0.336	  	   0.67	   0.290	  	   0.244	  	   0.148	   0.321	  	   0.273	  	   0.112	  
Christian	   0.598	  	   0.624	  	   0.489	   0.614	  	   0.601	  	   0.699	   0.607	  	   0.611	  	   0.895	  
HH	  size	  	   5.055	  	   4.994	  	   0.709	   5.012	  	   4.948	  	   0.683	   4.991	  	   4.896	  	   0.412	  
Age	  of	  child	  when	  first	  cared	  by	  caregivers	   0.082	   0.052	   0.252	   0.101	   0.084	   0.431	   0.089	   0.077	   0.361	  
Piped	  water	  main	  source	  of	  drinking	  water	  	   0.125	  	   0.116	  	   0.813	   0.099	  	   0.047	  	   0.003***	   0.113	  	   0.079	  	   0.134	  
Well	  main	  source	  of	  drinking	  water	  	   0.323	  	   0.408	  	   0.154	   0.303	  	   0.352	  	   0.335	   0.314	  	   0.372	  	   0.207	  
Surface	  water	  main	  source	  of	  drinking	  water	  	   0.370	  	   0.339	  	   0.602	   0.411	  	   0.466	  	   0.264	   0.383	  	   0.418	  	   0.436	  
HH	  treats	  their	  water	   0.385	  	   0.391	  	   0.888	   0.400	  	   0.360	  	   0.233	   0.407	  	   0.375	  	   0.28	  
Wealth	  index	  	   0.169	  	   0.165	  	   0.793	   -­‐0.409	  	   0.137	   0.216	   -­‐0.349	  	   0.098	   0.192	  
Owns	  another	  house	   0.179	  	   0.187	  	   0.783	   0.137	  	   0.128	  	   0.596	   0.162	  	   0.144	  	   0.181	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